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The Public Fiduciary:
emerging Themes in canadian Fiduciary
law For Pension TrusTees
Edward J Waitzer* and Douglas Sarro**
As society increasingly faces governance challenges at all levels, there is
a growing recognition of the need to take a longer term and more
systemic view of fiduciary obligations. We begin this article with a
summary discussion of how fiduciary duties have developed and been
applied in the pension fund context. We then review the efforts of the
Supreme Court of Canada to develop a broader conceptual framework
for fiduciary duties and consider steps that might be taken to address and
mitigate liability in respect of these duties in the context of pension fund
administration. We conclude by considering the trajectory of the law and
how it appears to be positioning fiduciaries with public responsibilities
and, in doing so, could alter legal and governance precepts.
Au fur et à mesure que les défis auxquels est confrontée la société en
matière de gouvernance croissent, et ce, à tous les niveaux, il paraît de
plus en plus évident qu’il faut favoriser une perspective plus systémique
et à plus long terme à l’égard des obligations fiduciaires. Les auteurs
débutent cet article en faisant une brève analyse de l’évolution des
obligations fiduciaires et de leur application dans le contexte des fonds
de pension. Ils examinent ensuite les efforts qu’a su faire la Cour
suprême du Canada en vue d’élargir le cadre théorique des obligations
fiduciaires et d’établir une démarche à suivre afin de régler et de mitiger
la question de leur responsabilité en ce qui a trait à ces obligations dans
le cadre de l’administration des fonds de pension. Les auteurs concluent
en examinant le parcours du droit et la leçon dont il semble imposer aux
fiduciaires des responsabilités publiques, ce qui pourrait avoir comme
effet de modifier les préceptes du droit et de la gouvernance.
1. Introduction
Fiduciary duty is a dynamic concept – one that has responded to changing
contexts and world views but is firmly rooted in clear and enduring legal
*

Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business; Partner, Stikeman
Elliott LLP.
**
Osgoode Hall Law School, JD 2013. The authors thank Keith Ambachtsheer,
Jim Hawley, Steve Lydenberg, Ben Richardson, and two anonymous reviewers for
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principles. As society increasingly faces governance challenges at all
levels, there is a growing recognition of the need to take a longer term and
more systemic view of fiduciary obligations, notwithstanding strong
incentives to the contrary. This need is particularly acute in the financial
services sector where, even as there has been a dramatic growth in reliance
upon financial intermediaries (such as pension funds, sovereign wealth
funds and other institutional investors) and a growing recognition of the
exposure of such intermediaries to systemic and extra-financial risks,
competencies and incentives remain severely misaligned.
Technology and innovation have fueled increased complexity in
financial flows and instruments. This has led to increased reliance on a
longer and more conflicted chain of service providers and increased
market volatility.1 A recent survey of European pension fund executives
and asset managers concluded that “there is a widespread perception in the
pension world that the investment industry is perverse in one crucial sense:
its food chain operates in reverse, with service providers at the top and
clients at the bottom. Agents fare better than principals.”2 Any system built
on a mismatch between expectations and outcomes is inherently
problematic.
In the pension sector,3 Canada is uniquely positioned to inform the
evolution of fiduciary standards as a legal response to these concerns for a
number of reasons. For one, it “punches above its weight” in respect of the
framework for public pension fund management. Indeed, the “Canada
model” of pension management and delivery – which is based on a
recognition that size, costs, and governance matter 4 – has gained
international prominence for its effectiveness and efficiency.5 Canada is
1

See e.g. Henry TC Hu, “Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure Information’
and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm” (2012) 97 Tex L Rev 1601.
2
Amin Rajan, DB & DC Plans: Strengthening Their Delivery (Tunbridge Wells,
UK: CREATE-Research, 2008).
3
While much of the research in this area has focused on pension funds to the
exclusion of other financial institutions, the key issues are generic and interrelated; see
e.g. John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making:
Final Report, online: (2012) Kay Review <www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law
/docs/k/12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report>. Kay recommends that
fiduciary standards be applied to “all relationships in the investment chain which involve
discretion over the investment of others or advice on investment decisions” and that these
obligations “should not be capable of being contractually overridden;” see ibid at 13.
4
See e.g. Keith Ambachtsheer, “Pension Fund Governance: Five Top
Challenges … And How to Address Them” The Ambachtsheer Letter 310 (January 2012)
[on file with authors].
5
“Canada’s pension funds – Maple Revolutionaries” The Economist 402:8774
(3 May 2012) 84, online: Economist <www.economist.com/node/21548970/print>.
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also unique in that its courts (the Supreme Court of Canada in particular)
have focused over an extended period of time (and in a variety of contexts)
on developing a coherent view of the nature of fiduciary relationships and
the consequences thereof. In doing so, they have extended the scope for
fiduciary duties and consequential remedies.
We begin this article with a summary discussion of fiduciary duties as
they have developed and been applied in the pension fund context. We then
review the efforts of the Supreme Court of Canada to develop a broader
conceptual framework for fiduciary duties. Having outlined theories of
liability that have arisen from this effort, we consider, in the context of
pension fund administration, steps that might be taken to address and
mitigate liability in respect of these duties.
We conclude by considering the trajectory of the law – why fiduciaries
are increasingly required to look beyond the immediate imperatives of the
market (at least as they seem at the time) towards longer-term, systemic
concerns, such as intergenerational equity and sustainable development.
This trajectory appears to be positioning fiduciaries with public
responsibilities and, in doing so, could alter legal and governance precepts.
2. The Evolving Obligations of Pension Fund Trustees
Pension trustees are subject to fiduciary obligations under common law and
pension regulation. These include duties of care,6 loyalty to the interests of
beneficiaries, and obedience to the purposes of the fund.7 Unlike corporate
law (where directors’ duties are to act in the best interests of the corporation
as a whole), trustees’ duties are to individual beneficiaries.
Fiduciary law is not static, nor, in the context of trusts, is it tied to a
particular investment theory.8 It has proven to be a remarkably flexible set
6
We recognize that there is a distinction between the duties owed by fiduciaries
and the duties owed by trustees, who are a species of fiduciary. We do, however, take the
position that the duty of care, far from being a duty unique to trust law, pervades most of
fiduciary law; see infra notes 78-83 and accompanying discussion.
7
Rob Atkinson, “Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty” (2008) 34 J
Corp L 43.
8
See e.g. Martin Wilder and Paul H Curnow, Superannuation Trustees and
Climate Change Report (Sydney: Baker & McKenzie International, 2012), online:
<http://www.bakermckenzie.com/BKClimateChangeSuperannuationTrusteesOct12/>. In
discussing changing expectations regarding long-term sustainability and the way in
which investments should be made, the report observes at 26 that “trustees should adapt
the way they apply the law to these changing circumstances and a defence that it has
always been done this way or structurally from an industry perspective that is not
possible is not acceptable.”
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of principles, subject to varying interpretations over time. When explaining
the rejection of prior interpretations of trustees’ fiduciary obligations (which
treated investment in equities as imprudent), the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts observed:
Trust law should reflect and accommodate current knowledge and concepts. It should
avoid repeating the mistake of freezing its rules against future learning and
developments.9

Following the collapse of the South Sea Bubble10 in 1720, English courts
of equity required trustees to restrict their investments to government
obligations and mortgages. This was the genesis of the legal list approach,
which restricted trustees to a prescribed list of investments.11 In Harvard
College v Amory, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a
different approach, instructing trustees “to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs.”12 The flexibility of
this objective behavioural standard was quickly circumscribed. In King v
Talbot,13 the New York Court of Appeals limited trustees to investments in
government bonds and mortgages. State legislatures subsequently enacted
legislation to the same effect.14 As recently as the 1970s, stock investments
were widely viewed as imprudent for trust fiduciaries.15
Over time, the market environment made this restrictive approach
impractical. Trustees needed to hedge against inflation and the superior
performance of equities (and foreign securities) militated in favour of
diversification. So, too, did growing acceptance of modern portfolio
theory, which suggested a portfolio-level approach to investment rather
than an approach based on discrete consideration of particular investments.
As a result, the legal paradigm shifted from restricted trustee powers to
broad managerial discretion within the bounds of overarching fiduciary

9

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule §227 (1992).
See John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, rev ed (London: Alan Sutton
Publishing Ltd, 1993). His comment that “[t]he maxim that credit was not wealth unless
it rested on a wealth-producing asset had been ignored” could just as easily be said about
today’s financial crisis; see ibid at 241.
11
George Keeton, Modern Developments in the Law of Trusts (Belfast: Northern
Ireland Legal Quarterly, 1971) at 46-62.
12
Harvard College v Amory, 9 Pick (26 Mass) 446 (1830).
13
40 NY 76 (1869).
14
See W Brantley Phillips Jr, “Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Prudent
Investment Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts” (1997) 54 Wash & Lee L Rev 335
at 341.
15
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §227, Comment (f) (1959).
10
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obligations.16 With the re-introduction of the “prudence standard” came
the repeal of rules prohibiting the delegation of investment responsibilities,
recognizing the growing complexity of managing financial assets and the
need for trustees to rely on professionals.17
The prudent person standard was refined in the 1990s by recognizing
that prudence should be measured on an overall portfolio basis.18 An
incidental consequence was to shift pension fiduciaries’ focus to portfoliolevel returns (based on the assumption that such a focus coincides with the
interests of plan beneficiaries). This shift was reflected in modifications to
the interpretation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)19 issued by the US Department of Labor. In discussing
economically targeted investments, a 1994 Interpretive Bulletin stated that:
The Department has construed the requirements that a fiduciary act solely in the
interest of, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to, participants and
beneficiaries as prohibiting a fiduciary from subordinating the interests of
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives.20

In contrast, this language was revised in 2008 to assert that:
Fiduciaries may never subordinate the economic interests of the plan to unrelated
objectives, and may not select investments on the basis of any factor outside the
economic interest of the plan except in very limited circumstances ….21

Modern portfolio theory, in addition to prescribing a portfolio-level
approach to investment, holds that price is the best guide to value, on the
assumption that markets efficiently incorporate all available information
about value (the efficient market hypothesis). Events of the last decade
have challenged the narrow application of the efficient market hypothesis
(and, as a result, the use of modern portfolio theory) as the basis for
prudent investment and risk management practices, along with the legal
16

See e.g. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 USC § 18.1104

(1974).
17

See e.g. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959).
See e.g. Uniform Prudent Investor Act §§ 2(b), (f) (1994); Pensions Act 1995
(UK), 1995, c 26, ss 33(1), 35, 36(2). These standards also recognize a higher standard
of care when a trustee is an investment professional
19
29 USC §1001, et seq.
20
Interpretive bulletin relating to the fiduciary standard under ERISA in
considering economically targeted investments, 29 CFR § 2509.94-1 (2000) [emphasis
added].
21
US Department of Labor, Advisory Opinion 2007-07A (21 December 2007)
and Advisory Opinion 2008-05A (27 June 2008) [emphasis added].
18
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framework that recommends pension fiduciaries adhere to this theory. For
example, it is now broadly accepted that most funds’ returns come from
general exposure to the market (beta) rather than seeking market
benchmark out-performance strategies (alpha).22 This makes systemic
market factors more critical to fiduciary responsibility.
There is also a growing recognition that “investment choice, like other
life choices, is being re-tuned to a shorter wave-length,” leading to
irrational investment decisions – particularly with respect to projects of
longer duration, which often yield the highest private (and social)
returns.23 Even before the 2008 financial crisis, a joint study by two
leading investment and business organizations found:
The obsession with short-term results by investors, asset management firms, and
corporate managers collectively leads to the unintended consequences of destroying
long-term value, decreasing market efficiency, reducing investment returns and
impeding efforts to strengthen corporate governance.24

Pension fiduciaries are increasingly expected to consider questions of
future value, rather than simply considering market price. Aside from the
hazards of market volatility, they are expected “to assess the impact of their
investment decisions on others, including generations to come,” with all
the uncertainties so entailed.25 There is a growing recognition that risk
management for pension funds extends well beyond that which is captured
by market benchmarks, requiring consideration of market integrity,
systemic risks, governance risks, advisor risks and the like.26

22
Roger Ibbotson, “The Importance of Asset Allocation” (2010) 66 Financial
Analysts J 18. While this concept is widely embraced by academics and market
professionals, there remains a significant gap in practice. We suspect that many pension
trustees would be hard pressed to explain the difference between alpha and beta in this
context and that most continue to assess their managers in relation to benchmarks.
23
Andrew Haldane and Richard Davies, “The Short Long” (Paper presented to
the 29th Société Universitaire Européene de Recherches Finanacières Colloquium,
Brussels, May 2011), online: Bank of England <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk
/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech495.pdf>.
24
CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity and Business Roundtable, Institute
for Corporate Ethics, “Breaking the Short-Term Cycle” (2006) 2006 CFA Institute. See
also CFA Institute, “Visionary Board Leadership – Stewardship for the Long Term”
(2012) 2012 CFA Institute.
25
Steve Lydenberg, “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty” J Bus Ethics
(forthcoming in 2013) at 11, online: Springer Link <http://link.springer.com/article/10
.1007%2Fs10551-013-1632-3.>.
26
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, “MetLife U.S. Pension Risk Behavior
Index” (February 2012) online: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company <http://www.
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The manner in which undue focus on the duty of care (discussed
below) as a liability mitigation strategy has created market volatility and
undermined sustainable wealth creation has been documented elsewhere.27
In brief, the obsession with not underperforming the market has been
driven, in part, by this duty (one can’t be faulted for “buying the market,”
and cutting costs to help portfolio performance). While frequently
characterized as long-term investing, this has been more accurately
described as “perpetual investors making short-term investments
forever.”28 It can lead to herding behavior and a short-term bias that
amplifies the volatility created by speculators and high frequency traders,
who are left to set market prices.
To the extent that current governance frameworks fail to facilitate a
smooth transition in the pricing of systemic risk and other externalities,
there are likely to be inflection points that trigger rapid re-pricing, with
severe consequences for various types of assets (for example, when a
realistic price is placed on carbon emissions). To take some recent
examples, what rationale could there be for investing in gun (or tobacco)
manufacturers other than a belief that society will not act to address the
costs such enterprises impose on others? Pension trustees should be
considering ways to mitigate consequential risks.29
Our thesis is that a renewed focus on the duty of loyalty (including
responsibility for the oversight of supply-chain conflicts of interest,
precautionary risk management, inter-generational impartiality and the
incorporation of sustainability factors into investment management
processes) would facilitate addressing these concerns.
3. Mapping Fiduciary Duties:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s Heroic Quest
To determine the relevance of the duty of loyalty, it is first necessary to
examine the principles and purposes that have motivated its development,
together with the broader development of fiduciary law. Common law
courts have tended to sidestep this approach; relying on the assumption
metlife.com/assets/institutional/services/cbf/retirement/MetLife-2012-Pension-Risk
-Behavior-Index-exp0213.pdf>.
27
See e.g. James P Hawley, Keith L Johnson and Edward J Waitzer, “Reclaiming
Fiduciary Duty Balance” (2011) 2 Rotman Int’l J of Pension Mgmt 4.
28
Comment by Simon Zadek in his presentation at the International Corporate
Governance Network Annual Conference (Rio di Janeiro, Brazil, July 2004), quoted in
Simon Zadek, Mira Merme and Richard Samans, Mainstreaming Responsible Investment
(Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2005) at 19.
29
Wilder and Curnow, supra note 8 at 8.
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(explicit or implied) that no principled basis for fiduciary law exists, they
have adopted a category-based approach, under which relationships are
recognized as fiduciary if they fall within, or sufficiently resemble
historically recognized categories of fiduciary relationships.30 The
Supreme Court of Canada has been an exception, showing unusual
ambition in a protracted and deliberate effort to develop a broad conceptual
framework for fiduciary duties.31
The Court’s singular focus and unique perspective on fiduciary duties
can be traced to its need to address Crown liability to Aboriginal peoples.
In Guerin v The Queen,32 the Court recognized a new class of fiduciary
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, under which the
Crown could be liable as a fiduciary for encroachments on Aboriginal
rights. In so doing, the Court rejected a category-based approach to
fiduciary law, stating that “[i]t is the nature of the relationship, not the
specific category of actor involved that gives rise to the fiduciary duty.”33
The Court went on to state that a relationship is fiduciary in nature where
30

Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 384 [Guerin] (listing trustees,
solicitors, corporate directors, and partners as the four historically-recognized categories
of fiduciary). See also Paul Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability” (2011) 56 McGill
LJ 235 at 237 (“the law has evolved absent a general theory of liability”); James
Edelman, “When do Fiduciary Duties Arise?” (2010) 126 LQ Rev 302 at 305 (“[a]midst
this confusion and conflict [over the principles behind fiduciary duties], most
commentators and judges are in agreement on one matter: the quest to define fiduciary
relationships ‘continues without evident sign of success’”).
31
Though in the past, other common law courts have shown little interest in
following Canada’s approach, recent scholarship suggests that the gap between the
approach taken in Canada and that taken in other jurisdictions is narrowing. Compare
Breen v Williams (1996), 186 CLR 71 at para 15 (HCA) [Breen], per Brennan CJ (“the
notion of fiduciary duty in Canada does not accord with the notion in the United
Kingdom. Nor, in my opinion, does the Canadian notion accord with the law of fiduciary
duty as understood in this country” (citations omitted)); Leonard I Rotman, “Fiduciary
Law’s ‘Holy Grail’: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence” (2011)
91 BU L Rev 921 at 950-52, 961-69 (comparing Canadian and American fiduciary
jurisprudence, and concluding that similar considerations drive the development of
fiduciary law in both countries).
32
Guerin, supra note 30 at 384.
33
Ibid. Though it has been argued that Guerin and other cases addressing
fiduciary duties owed to Aboriginals may be separated from the general jurisprudence on
fiduciary duties, the Supreme Court’s frequent invocations of Guerin in cases involving
other fiduciary relationships suggests that Guerin should be read as being integrated with
the rest of the jurisprudence. See Robert Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary
Accountability” (2004) Can Bar Rev 35 at 67 (arguing that Guerin can be, or can already
be considered, “detached” from the general jurisprudence); Alberta v Elder Advocates of
Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 SCR 261 at para 29 [Elder Advocates] (stating
that Guerin establishes “foundational principles” for fiduciary law generally).
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one party (the fiduciary) has discretionary power over the interests of
another (the beneficiary), and is obligated to use that power to serve the
best interests of the other party.34 Fiduciary law aims to ensure that
fiduciaries act in accordance with this obligation.35
In Hodgkinson v Simms,36 the Court offered two related justifications
for regulating the use of fiduciary power. First, fiduciary law compensates
for beneficiaries’ inherent vulnerability to abuse of power by fiduciaries.
Because of the often highly specialized nature of fiduciary services,
beneficiaries cannot meaningfully monitor the fiduciary’s work and must
trust the fiduciary to exercise care and look after their best interests.37 Such
a relationship, the Court noted, cannot be “characterized by a dynamic of
mutual autonomy,” and for this reason, “the marketplace cannot always set
the rules.”38 Instead, fiduciary law imposes a higher standard, rooted in
norms of loyalty and good faith, to protect clients’ interests.39
In protecting the interests of individual clients, the Court added,
fiduciary law also seeks to protect the interests of the public as a whole.40
The Court noted that fiduciary services, which range from medicine, to
lawyering, to financial advice, are vital to our economy and society at
large. But individuals will not trust fiduciaries with their health or property,
or to provide other specialized advice, unless they have reason to be
confident that fiduciaries will not abuse this trust.41
This provides the second and principal justification for fiduciary law:
to bolster public confidence in fiduciary services, and thus secure the
34
Guerin, ibid. See also Galambos v Perez, 2009 SCC 48, [2009] 3 SCR 247 at
paras 70, 76 [Galambos].
35
Galambos, ibid at para 67.
36
[1994] 3 SCR 377 [Hodgkinson].
37
Ibid at 420-22.
38
Ibid at 422.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid. Beneficiaries’ attitude towards fiduciaries can be expressed as “trust but
verify.” Though some have argued that the idea that beneficiaries should verify
fiduciaries’ loyalty is inimical to the idea of trust, some authors have managed to resolve
this contradiction. See Richard Holton, “Fiduciary Relations and the Nature of Trust”
(2011) 91 BU L Rev 991 at 992 (“In general, to trust is not to believe in performance; it
is to act as if one believed. But the action-as-if can be partial. Indeed, it is almost bound
to be partial. ... In particular, whilst trusting, it may be rational to verify that one will not
be let down. Thus, the action-as-if only extends so far”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at xvi [Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (“The
Russian proverb ‘Trust but verify’ is self-contradictory but true. People compare the cost
of trusting and relying on others with the cost of verification”).
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economic and social welfare these services promise, by “reinforc[ing] the
integrity of [the] social institutions and enterprises” though which
fiduciaries provide their services.42
The Court’s definition of the nature of the fiduciary relationship, and
its justifications for the imposition of fiduciary duties, draws from the work
of scholars from Canada and abroad.43 For instance, in defining the social
purpose of fiduciary duties, the Court relied heavily on scholarship
chronicling the rise of the “fiduciary society.”44 The central aspect of a
fiduciary society is a high degree of specialization in the professions.45
Specialization is intended to spur knowledge creation and generate wealth
for individuals and society as a whole.46
Specialization also makes us more interdependent – it requires us to
trust and rely on the expertise and services of strangers.47 Lawyers rely on
42

Hodgkinson, ibid.
The concept of a fiduciary relationship as one involving the exercise of
discretionary power, coupled with an obligation to use that power in the interests of the
fiduciary, as well as the idea that fiduciary law operates to protect vulnerable
beneficiaries from the abuse of fiduciary power, had already been well-developed prior
to Guerin, and continues to reflect current scholarly views. See e.g. Ernest J Weinrib,
“The Fiduciary Obligation” (1976) 25 UTLJ 1 at 4-5 (“the fiduciary must have scope for
the exercise of discretion, and, second, this discretion must be capable of affecting the
legal position of the principal … [t]he wide leeway afforded to the fiduciary to affect the
legal position of the principal in effect puts the latter at the mercy of the former, and
necessitates the existence of a legal device which will induce the fiduciary to use his
power beneficently”); PD Finn, The Fiduciary Obligation (Sydney: The Law Book Co,
1977) at 3 (defining fiduciaries as “a class of persons who, having been entrusted with
powers for another’s benefit, are under a general equitable obligation when dealing with
those powers, to act honestly in what they consider to be that other’s interests”). See also
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 41 at 7-8; Deborah A DeMott, “Beyond Metaphor:
An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation” (1988) 37 Duke LJ 879 at 915; Deborah A DeMott,
“Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their
Consequences” (2006) 48 Ariz L Rev 925 at 945 [DeMott, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty”];
D Gordon Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty” (2002) 55 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1399, 1402; Robert H Sitkoff, “The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law”
(2011) 91 BU L Rev 1039 at 1049.
44
Frankel, “Fiduciary Law” (1983) 71 Ca L Rev 795 at 802.
45
Ibid at 803.
46
Ibid. See also Weinrib, supra note 43 at 11 (“[a] sophisticated industrial and
commercial society requires that its members be integrated rather than autonomously
self-sufficient”).
47
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 41 at 271; Tamar Frankel, “Fiduciary Law
in the Twenty-First Century” (2011) 91 BU L Rev 1289 at 1292; James E Post,
“Governance, Accountability, and Trust: A Comment on the Work of Tamar Frankel”
(2011) BU L Rev 1165, 1173.
43
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doctors for medical care, who in turn rely on financial advisors to invest
their savings, and so the cycle goes. The rise of the fiduciary society, in this
sense, is a classic nonzero-sum game, where every player can benefit, but
only so long as these players co-operate with one another.48 If fiduciaries
breach their duties, and beneficiaries lose trust in fiduciary services and
sever their relationships with fiduciaries, the game fails and everyone
loses. The recent financial crisis demonstrates the scale of the costs of noncooperation, and how these costs are likely to continue to grow as financial
flows and instruments become more complex.49
The Court’s understanding that fiduciaries serve a public purpose, and
its belief that fiduciary law should therefore respond to changing social
needs, has led it to adopt a dynamic approach to determining (a) when
fiduciary obligations arise and (b) the nature and scope of these
obligations.
Though other common law jurisdictions have not explicitly adopted
the Supreme Court’s approach, it has been argued that some of these courts
have been motivated by similar considerations.50 The Court’s focus on the
public interests served by fiduciaries also reflects approaches taken by civil
law jurisdictions with respect to fiduciary-like duties.51
As such, the Court’s reasoning, through an extended series of
decisions, provides guidance as to the likely course of fiduciary law. Due
to its focus on evolving public interests and needs, the Court’s work is
highly relevant to pension trustees, a class of fiduciary that will need to
grapple with considerable social and institutional challenges in the coming
years.
48

That fiduciary services tend to carry considerable social importance, and often
require considerable training and expertise to provide, reinforces the need for
cooperation. For more on nonzero-sum games and game theory in general, see Robert
Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation, rev ed (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Anatol
Rapoport, “Fights, Games, and Debates” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1960).
49
Post, supra note 47 at 1166-67; Joshua Getzler, “‘As If.’ Accountability and
Counterfactual Trust” (2011) 91 BU L Rev 973 at 973 [Getzler, “‘As If’”].
50
See Rotman, supra note 31 at 950-52, 961-69 (comparing Canadian and
American fiduciary jurisprudence, and concluding that similar considerations drive the
development of fiduciary law in both countries).
51
See e.g. German Corporate Governance Code, as amended on 15 May 2012
(highlighting the importance of “promot[ing] the trust of … the general public in the
management and supervision of listed German stock corporations,” and citing directors’
“obligation … to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable
creation of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy”
[emphasis added]).
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A) When Fiduciary Obligations Arise
The Court’s test for determining whether fiduciary obligations arise flows
from its definition of the nature of the fiduciary relationship. It has held
that there are two necessary elements to a fiduciary relationship: (1) the
beneficiary must be vulnerable to the discretionary power of the fiduciary,
and (2) the fiduciary must be subject to an undertaking to exercise this
discretionary power in the best interests of the beneficiary.52 The existence
of these elements hinges on the “reasonable expectations” of the parties to
the relationship — the extent to which an alleged beneficiary reasonably
expects loyal conduct from the fiduciary, and the extent to which an
alleged fiduciary could reasonably have expected to be bound by duties of
loyalty and care.53
Fiduciary law’s concern with the beneficiary’s “inherent vulnerability
to exploitative exercise of discretionary power by the fiduciary”54 reflects
equity’s broad objective of “protect[ing] vulnerable parties in transactions
with others,” which it seeks to achieve through the combined effect of
fiduciary law and the doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability.55
In Frame v Smith,56 Wilson J identified three hallmarks of a
relationship of vulnerability:
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the
beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding
the discretion or power.57
52

Elder Advocates, supra note 33 at paras 27-36.
Hodgkinson, supra note 36 at 412 (noting that fiduciary relationships turn on
the “reasonable expectations of the parties” [emphasis added]); Galambos, supra note 34
at para 76 (noting that the reasonable expectations of one party alone will not in
themselves give rise to a fiduciary relationship). This diverges from the approach
advocated by some scholars, who argue that the reasonable expectations of the
beneficiary should be sufficient to ground a fiduciary relationship; see e.g. DeMott,
“Breach of Fiduciary Duty,” supra note 43 at 936 (“The defining or determining criterion
should be whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be
justified in expecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether the actor’s
conduct contravened that expectation”).
54
Miller, supra note 30 at 281.
55
Hodgkinson, supra note 36 at 405.
56
Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 [Frame].
57
Ibid at 136. Though this statement was made in dissent, it was later adopted by
a majority of the Court; see Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd,
[1989] 2 SCR 574 at 598-99 [Lac Minerals].
53

2012]

The Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in Canadian …

175

The extent to which a beneficiary is “peculiarly vulnerable to or at the
mercy of” the fiduciary will depend on the extent to which the beneficiary
reasonably expected that the fiduciary would act in his or her interests.
Such a reasonable expectation leads beneficiaries to limit the extent to
which they monitor the fiduciary’s activities, or, where the fiduciary is an
advisor, to accept a fiduciary’s advice without closely scrutinizing it. The
extent to which a beneficiary’s expectation of loyal conduct is reasonable
will depend on “factors such as trust, confidence, complexity of subject
matter, and community or industry standards.”58
In Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co,59 the Court concluded that a pension plan
administrator and a pension’s plan members and beneficiaries have a
relationship with these characteristics, as a plan administrator has “wide
discretion with respect to [a] pension plan, which it could exercise
unilaterally and which could affect the interests of the [plan members] and
to which exercise of discretion the [plan members] were vulnerable.”60
Vulnerability alone, however, is not sufficient to establish a
relationship as fiduciary in nature. The fiduciary must also be under an
undertaking to use its discretionary power to serve the best interests of the
beneficiary.61 The undertaking provides a basis on which the fiduciary
could reasonably have expected to be bound to act with loyalty to a
beneficiary’s best interests and with reasonable care, diligence and skill.
To give rise to such a reasonable expectation, however, this
undertaking generally must be made to a defined person or class of
persons62 and relate to a legal or substantial practical interest of the
beneficiary.63

58

Hodgkinson, supra note 36 at 412.
2010 SCC 34, [2010] 2 SCR 273.
60
Ibid at para 119.
61
Galambos, supra note 34 at para 69. See also Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR
226 at 273 [Norberg].
62
Elder Advocates, supra note 33 at para 36. A charitable trust, which may be
established to advance a social purpose rather than a defined group of beneficiaries,
stands as an exception to this general rule. See Commissioners for Special Purposes of
the Income Tax v Pemsel, [1891] AC 531 at 583; Vancouver Society of Immigrant and
Visible Minority Women v MNR, [1999] 1 SCR 10 at paras 32-33.
63
Non-economic interests, including “fundamental human and personal
interests,” can meet this threshold; this sets Canada apart from other common law
jurisdictions, such as Australia. See Norberg, supra note 61 at 276-77; Miller, supra note
30 at 275-76.
59
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In the case of pension plan administrators, the undertaking generally
arises by agreement, as set out in the plan documentation.64 An undertaking
may also derive from a statute or a unilateral undertaking of the fiduciary.65
An undertaking may be express or implied.66 For example, an implicit
undertaking arises when a person entrusts an advisor with information or
seeks “advice in circumstances that confer a source of power,”67 so long as
the advisor can be reasonably expected to counsel the “advised party as to
how his interests will or might best be served.”68
The undertaking is central to a fiduciary obligation both because it
establishes that the fiduciary could reasonably have expected that he or she
would be bound to act with loyalty and care, and because it defines the
scope of the fiduciary’s obligations to act in this manner.
For instance, an employer that has also undertaken to act as a pension
plan administrator has been held to wear “two hats.”69 When administering
and investing the plan funds, the employer is using powers delegated to it
as an administrator under the plan documentation, and thus owes fiduciary
duties to plan members and beneficiaries. But when amending the plan, the
employer is acting in its own capacity as employer and thus generally owes
no fiduciary duties.70 However, a court will not allow a fiduciary to escape
its fiduciary obligations through technicalities – for instance, where an
employer/administrator uses its powers as an employer in a way that
64
Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc., 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 SCR 678 at para 85
[Nolan]. The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board’s undertaking to invest funds in the
best interests of contributors and beneficiaries is imposed by statute; see Canada Pension
Plan Investment Board Act, SC 1997, c 40, s 5(b) [CPPIB Act].
65
Guerin, supra note 30 at 384.
66
Ibid at 384.
67
Galambos, supra note 34 at para 84.
68
Such a reasonable expectation will likely arise where and “the advisor would
be expected both to be disinterested, save for his remuneration, and to be free of adverse
responsibilities;” see PD Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle” in TG Youdan, ed, Equity,
Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 1 at 50-51, cited in Hodgkinson, supra
note 34.
69
Imperial Oil Ltd v Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1995), 18 CCPB 198
at paras 30-33 [Imperial Oil]. The Crown has also been held to wear “multiple hats”
when exercising fiduciary duties, unlike with respect to pension fund administrators,
courts have held that the Crown’s responsibilities to multiple constituencies give it
discretion to abrogate its fiduciary duties unilaterally by legislation; see Authorson v
Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 39, [2003] 2 SCR 40 at para 15. In the case of fiduciary duties
owed to Aboriginal people, which are constitutionally protected, the Crown is required to
meet a justification test when infringing on its duty of loyalty; see R v Sparrow, [1990] 1
SCR 1075; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010.
70
Imperial Oil, ibid. The plan documentation sets out the contexts in which the
administrator is acting as administrator and thus subject to the duty of loyalty.
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endangers the beneficiaries’ existing interests in the plan, that employer
will likely be held to a fiduciary standard.71
B) Nature and Scope of the Duties
Values of trust and loyalty, shaped by “reasonable expectations,” form the
basis of the broad fiduciary standards set by the Court.72 Hence, fiduciary
duties are open-textured.73 It has been said that these standards are too
vague to give meaningful guidance to fiduciaries.74 They do, however,
help fiduciary law achieve its objective of instilling confidence in fiduciary
services in two ways. First, open-textured standards can be more easily
adapted to changing social needs. Second, by refusing to set bright line
standards for fiduciary conduct, these standards ideally encourage
fiduciaries to err on the side of caution, holding themselves to higher
standards as a means of avoiding liability.75
The two primary duties flowing from the concept of the fiduciary
relationship developed by the Supreme Court of Canada are the duties of
care and loyalty.76 Below, we describe their nature, their scope, and their
relationship to the concept of fiduciary duties developed by the Court.

71
Sun Indalex Finance LLC v United Steelworkers, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] SCJ No
6 (QL) at paras 65-66, 269-71.
72
For discussion of the relationship between values of trust and loyalty and
fiduciary law, see Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioural Foundation of Corporate Law” (2001) 149 U Pa L Rev 1735 at 1796.
73
Even those components of fiduciary duties that might be seen as relatively
stable bright-line rules, such as the rule against conflicts, have been adapted over time to
respond to changing social needs; see Finn, supra note 43 at 4. A standard that is opentextured is not capable of precise definition. Instead, courts give them meaning by
applying them to specific fact scenarios, drawing from the political and social culture in
which these standards operate. Examples of open-textured standards may include “due
process,” “fairness,” and “reasonable expectations;” see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 131-32.
74
See e.g. infra note 90 and accompanying discussion.
75
Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Death of Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporations”
(1990) 138 U Pa L Rev 1675 at 1696 (“[t]he very ambiguity of the language conveys its
moral content as the court’s refusal to set lines is designed to discourage marginal
conduct by making it difficult for a fiduciary to determine the point at which self-serving
conduct will be prohibited, and thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.”)
76
Hodgkinson, supra note 34 at 405; Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada
(Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 SCR 344 at para 38,
per McLachlin J, concurring [Blueberry River].
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1) The Duty of Care
As in the United States,77 the fiduciary’s duty of care, skill and diligence
has been held to be “at the heart of the fiduciary obligation” in Canada.78
The rest of the common law world, most notably England and Wales,
appears to be gradually moving towards adopting the same position.79 That
being said, a number of scholars and courts (at least historically) have
argued that the duty of care is not a fiduciary duty, but a product of discrete
areas of law governing specific categories of relationships, such as trust
law and corporate law.80
This difference in view may be a product of different views of the
purposes of fiduciary law. If one defines fiduciary law’s purpose as being
solely to deter self-dealing by fiduciaries,81 it is admittedly difficult to
establish a logical connection between fiduciary obligations and a duty of
care. But the Supreme Court of Canada has held that fiduciary law is
intended to achieve the broader purpose of ensuring public confidence in
social institutions.82 One means of achieving this purpose is to protect
beneficiaries from the “careless, inept, or inattentive” exercise of the
fiduciary’s discretionary power over the beneficiary.83
It has also been argued that a fiduciary duty of care should not be
recognized because it overlaps with the duties of care that apply in contract

77

See Part 2, above.
Blueberry River, supra note 76. But see KLB v British Columbia, 2003 SCC
51, [2003] 2 SCR 403 at para 49 [KLB] (where the Supreme Court holds that parental
fiduciary obligations do not include a duty of care). To date, the Supreme Court has not
used KLB as a precedent to further restrict the ambit of the fiduciary duty of care. For an
account of other duties that have been recognized by Canadian courts, see Miller, supra
note 26 at 257-58.
79
See Futter v Futter, [2011] EWCA Civ 197 at para 127 (recognizing that
“trustees’ duty to take relevant matters into account [in carrying out their responsibilities]
is a fiduciary duty”); JD Heydon, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care
and Skill Fiduciary?” in Simone Degeling and James Edelman, eds, Equity in
Commercial Law (Sydney: Law Book Co, 2005) 185 (the author, a justice of the High
Court of Australia, rejects existing Australian precedent and states that there is a fiduciary
duty of care and skill).
80
See e.g. Flannigan, supra note 33; Breen, supra note 31; Bristol & West
Building Society v Mothew, [1998] Ch 1[Mothew].
81
See e.g. Flannigan, ibid.
82
Hodgkinson, supra note 36 at 422. See also Rotman, supra note 31 at 950-52,
961-69 (arguing that the same justification for the imposition of fiduciary duties applies
in the United States).
83
Miller, supra note 29 at 284.
78
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and tort law.84 Yet these classes of duties are distinguishable. The tort or
contract duty of care imposes only a negative obligation to avoid acts that
cause reasonably foreseeable harm to the beneficiary of the duty.85 The
fiduciary duty of care, on the other hand, also imposes a positive obligation
to exercise “diligence” in “determining whether and how to act upon
[fiduciary] authority.”86 Furthermore, it requires the exercise of “skill,”
recognizing that fiduciary duties often arise because the fiduciary holds
some special training or expertise.87
The Court has summarized these positive and negative obligations in
its requirement that a fiduciary exercise the same degree of care as “a
person of ordinary prudence in managing his or her own affairs.”88 In the
case of pension administrators, this standard of care has been elevated by
statute, requiring the exercise of the same degree of care that “a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another
person.”89

84
See WMC Gummow, “Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” in
Youdan, supra note 68. See also Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co, [1991] 3 SCR
534 at 573 (rejecting this argument as being motivated by “a misguided sense of
orderliness”)
85
Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537.
86
Miller, supra note 30 at 283. See also Rotman, supra note 31 at 959 (noting
that fiduciary law “imposes strict duties consistent with the prescriptivism of equity,
which stresses modes of behavior that are to be aspired to”); Julie Cassidy, “The Stolen
Generation: Canadian and Australian Approaches to Fiduciary Duties” (2003) 34 Ottawa
L Rev 175 at 207-209 (“a wealth of authority provides that equity does not merely impose
proscriptive duties [requiring only that fiduciaries avoid certain activities], but also
imposes positive duties on fiduciaries”).
87
Miller, ibid. This is not to suggest that, in the context of pension
administration, trustees with general intelligence and independent judgement, coupled
with a commitment to the interests of beneficiaries, cannot contribute effectively.
88
Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, 2009 SCC 9, [2009] 1 SCR 222
at para 131. See also Fales v Canada Permanent Trust Co (1976), [1977] 2 SCR 302, 70
DLR (3d) 257 at 267 (which sets the standard as that of “a man of ordinary prudence in
managing his own affairs”); Froese v Montreal Trust Co of Canada (1996) 137 DLR
(4th) 725 (BC CA) at para 58 [Froese]; Adam v Adam (Estate of John Douglas Alexander
Adam), 2003 MBQB 271 at para 22, (2003), 181 Man R (2d) 18; Estate of Therese Marie
Sutherland, 2007 MBQB 70 at para 27 (2007), 215 Man R (2d) 38; Barabash Estate (Re),
1999 ABQB 656 at paras 13-14, [1999] AJ No 1012 (QL).
89
Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, RSC 1985, c 32 (2nd Supp), s 8(4)
[CPBSA] [emphasis added]. Provincial pension benefits statutes use similar language.
This standard is presumed to be a higher one because a person is expected to be more
prudent when managing another person’s property than when managing his or her own;
see Ari Kaplan, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 333.
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Critics of the “prudent person” standard include the Ontario Expert
Commission on Pensions, which was led by Professor Harry Arthurs. The
Arthurs Report called the standard “very vague,” adding that it failed even
to “lay down at least the main principles involving investment
decisions.”90
For instance, the prudent person standard does not make clear who
bears the risk of liability when pension administrators delegate their
responsibilities to consultants, advisors, and appraisers, a practice that is
commonplace in today’s investment environment. One of the foundations
of fiduciary law is the idea that trustees will be deterred from abusing their
powers when they know that they can be required to act “as if” they can be
trusted by their beneficiaries.91 This powerful constraint on self-serving
conduct is weakened where various arm’s length professionals are retained
to fulfill investment functions in place of trustees and the duties of such
delegates are left unclear. The longer the supply chain becomes, the greater
the risk that a conflict of interest will arise.92
Worse still, legal uncertainty creates perverse incentives for
administrators to avoid liability by delegating responsibility, while the
delegates in turn mitigate liability by contracting out of it,93 by providing
advice but not making final decisions, or by seeking indemnity.94 The
result of these actions “can be a circular system in which no one takes
responsibility and the interests of agents trump those of pension
beneficiaries.”95 While some jurisdictions have enacted legislation

90
Ontario, Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions,
Affordable Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008) at 85 [Arthurs
Report].
91
See e.g. Joshua Getzler, “‘As If,’” supra note 49 at 974. A trustee is required
to act “as if” they can be trusted by surrendering any profits gained by abusing their
discretionary power, in addition to compensating the beneficiary for any damages
suffered. Thus, a fiduciary’s scope of liability, and hence the power of fiduciary law as a
deterrent, far exceeds the deterrents offered by tort and contract law, which focus solely
on a plaintiff’s actual losses rather than a defendant’s gains.
92
Hu, supra note 1. See also Paul Wooley, “Investing for your own and the
greater good,” Alliance (June 2012) at 20, online: www.alliancemagazine.org.
93
See Ruth Sullivan, “UK debates fiduciary duty confusion” Financial Times (16
July 2012).
94
Hawley, Johnson and Waitzer, supra note 27 at 9.
95
Ibid.
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governing administrators’ selection and monitoring of agents and
subjecting agents to fiduciary duties,96 several have not.97
In response to this and other ambiguities arising from the prudent
person standard, the Arthurs Report called for the replacement of the
prudent person standard with a set of clear investment rules imposed by
statute.98 A similar approach was adopted in the UK Companies Act 2006,
requiring corporate directors to have regard for the long-term
consequences of their decisions, including their likely effects on
stakeholders, the broader community, and the environment.99 Reports have
advocated similar guidance in the institutional investment context.100
It should be recalled that, historically, the duty of care was addressed,
in part, through the application of quantitative and qualitative investment
restrictions – imposing constraints on risk-taking by trustees by requiring
investment in “safe” securities. At least one author has suggested the
reinstatement of similar barriers “to recover the public dimension of trust
institutions” – serving society’s financial needs fairly and effectively.101
Even if these reforms are not implemented through statute, it is likely
that they will influence the way in which courts interpret the prudent
person standard. For instance, perhaps in recognition of the growing
96
See e.g. Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P.8, ss 22(5), (7)-(8) [OPBA];
Pension Benefits Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 352, ss 8(7)-(8) [BCPBA]; Pension
Benefits Act, RSNS 1989, c 34, ss 29(4)-(6) [NSPBA]; The Pension Benefits Act, CCSM,
c P32, ss 28.1(6)-(8) [MPBA]; Pension Benefits Act, SNB 1987, c P-5.1, s 18. Québec,
being a civil law jurisdiction, does not impose fiduciary duties per se on agents. It does,
however, impose reporting and other obligations. See Supplemental Pension Plans Act,
RSQ, c R-15.1, ss 154-154.4.
97
See e.g. CPBSA, supra note 89; Pension Benefits Act, 1992, SS 1992, c P6.001; Pension Benefits Act, 1997, SNL 1996, c P-4.01; Pension Fund Act, RSA 2000, c
P-4. Prince Edward Island, Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut do not have
pension benefits legislation.
98
Arthurs Report, supra note 90 at 86.
99
Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 172.
100 See e.g. FairPensions, “Protecting Our Best Interests: Rediscovering Fiduciary
Obligation” (March 2011) at 6, online: Fair Pensions <http://www.fairpensions
.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/fidduty/FPProtectingOurBestInterests.pdf>;
Towers Watson, “We need a bigger boat: Sustainability in Investment” (2012) at 4,
online: Towers Watson <http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/7818/TW-EU-2012
-26220-Sustainability-in-Investment.pdf> (proposing a working definition of sustainable
investing: long-term investing that is efficient, in that it provides the highest return per
unit of risk, and inter-generationally sound, in that different generations get a similar sort
of deal, allowing for risk).
101 Joshua Getzler, “Fiduciary Investment in the Shadow of Financial Crisis: Was
Lord Eldon Right?” (2009) 3 J Equity 1 at 26.
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complexities of pension administration, and the emergence of a growing
number of pension trustee education programs,102 this standard has already
been interpreted to suggest that trustees of a pension plan should possess
adequate training to carry out their responsibilities.103 It has also been held
to require that they retain experts where necessary to help them make
investment decisions,104 that administrators ensure “that the … capital [of
the plan] not be placed unduly at risk of loss,” and “that the funds be
invested in a way to generate a suitable rate of return.”105 The principle of
diversification has been called “generally a good one to apply across a
portfolio.”106
The most important point to take away is that the prudent person
standard, like all aspects of the fiduciary relationship, is dynamic, and
likely to be elaborated and adapted as necessary to meet changing social
and economic challenges and expectations.
2) The Duty of Loyalty
We have outlined how, with the ascent of the efficient market hypothesis
and modern portfolio theory, the standard of the duty of care became
interpreted as a convenient benchmark (and liability shield) for pension
102 See, for example, the Board Effectiveness Program developed by the
International Centre for Pension Management at the Rotman School of Business
(www.rijpm.com), the investment and governance courses offered by Shareholder
Association for Research & Education (www.share.ca) or the trustee programs developed
by the Pensions and Capital Stewardship Project at Harvard Law School
(www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/LWPpensions_about.html).
103 That the prudent person standard refers to “ordinary prudence” rather than
ordinary skill or knowledge reinforces the expectation that a fiduciary will undergo
training to gain the knowledge and skill necessary to exercise his or her discretion
prudently; see Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA),
CAPSA Pension Plan Governance Guidelines (Toronto: CAPSA, 2003), “Principle 5:
Knowledge and skills” at 7, online: CAPSA <http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init
/governance_guidelines/Guideline_Self-assess_Questionnaire.pdf> [CAPSA Governance
Guidelines]. To date, we are not aware of any training standard or requirement for
pension trustees in Canada.
104 The statutes that apply to pension administrators confirm that administrators
must use any relevant expertise they have or ought to have in exercising their authority.
At common law, it has been held to be prudent for pension administrators, along with
other fiduciaries, such as directors of corporations, to retain experts to aid in making
decisions. See R v Christophe, 2009 ONCJ 586 at para 23 [Christophe]; BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 at paras 152, 163 [BCE]. See also
Kaplan, supra note 89 at 334.
105 Christophe, ibid at para 24.
106 Ibid.
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fiduciaries insofar as it encouraged them to adhere to common practices.107
The hazards of this approach became evident during the financial crisis.
The consequential increase in focus on short-term investing (coupled with
the dramatic growth in pension assets) functioned like an “economic wavegeneration machine.”108 Herding behaviour created market volatility and
undermined sustainable wealth creation. Likewise, excessive reliance on
peer comparisons resulted in a shift towards relative performance metrics
rather than a focus on risk-adjusted returns and the best interests of
beneficiaries.
While the duty of care has been the focus of legal liability in recent
years, there is no question as to the relative priority of the duty of loyalty:
When duties of loyalty and care collide, courts generally resolve the conflict in favour
of the duty of loyalty representing minimum conduct to which the fiduciary must
adhere.109

The duty of loyalty is the central duty flowing from the fiduciary
relationship.110 As noted, the social institutions that fiduciary law is
intended to protect can function only if there is reason to trust that
fiduciaries will use the powers granted to them to serve the best interests
of their beneficiaries. Without this trust, individuals will be less likely to
retain fiduciary services and they will lose the benefits associated with
these services. As the Court has observed, this loss of trust will also harm
the public at large.111
The duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary act in the best interests
of the beneficiary.112 This general principle has provided the foundation
for most of the concrete rules courts have traditionally imposed on
fiduciaries. The duty of loyalty has been held to prohibit fiduciaries from
(a) using their powers to their own advantage;113 (b) using their powers to
107 Russell Galer, Prudent Person Rule Standard for the Investment of Pension
Fund Assets, (2002) 83 OECD Financial Market Trends.
108 Hawley, Johnson and Waitzer, supra note 27 at 7; Keith L Johnson and Frank
Jan de Graaf, “Modernizing Pension Fund Legal Standards for the 21st Century” (2009)
2 Rotman Int’l J of Pension Mgmt 44.
109 Arthur B Laby, “Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships”
(2004) 54 Am U L Rev 75.
110 Ibid; Miller, supra note 30 at 270 (referring to the “cardinal fiduciary duty of
loyalty”).
111 Hodgkinson, supra note 36 at 422; Frankel, supra note 44 at 802
112 Galambos, supra note 34 at para 69.
113 Canadian Aero Services Ltd v O’Malley, [1974] SCR 592; Regal (Hastings)
Ltd v Gulliver, [1942] 1 All ER 378. This does not, however, prevent the fiduciary from
securing “indirect or incidental” benefits for him or herself, or for third parties; see
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provide benefits for a third party;114 (c) delegating their powers to a third
party;115 and (d) agreeing to act as a fiduciary for multiple persons who
may have conflicting interests, without the informed consent of each
person.116 It also has been held to require fiduciaries acting for multiple
beneficiaries to (e) treat those beneficiaries impartially.117 This list is by no
means exhaustive.118 Some of these rules, most notably (as noted above)
the rule against delegation of powers, have been modified by statute and
regulation.119
Given the open-textured nature of the duty of loyalty, courts may
develop new rules to respond to changing social and economic needs.120
For example, courts have increasingly held that, in assessing the best
interests of the beneficiary, a fiduciary must consider not only the
beneficiary’s narrow pecuniary interests, but the beneficiary’s status as a
responsible member of society.121 This means that it must comply with the
law and generally avoid conduct that is unethical or otherwise does not
reflect prevailing social norms.122 In summary, as its name implies, the
duty of loyalty obliges “utmost loyalty to the beneficiary,” both as an
economic actor and as a responsible citizen.123

Lockheed Corp v Spink, 517 US 882 (1996) at 893-94, quoted in Nolan, supra note 64 at
para 54.
114 Galambos, supra note 34 at para 31; Mothew, supra note 80.
115 A number of exceptions to this rule have been created by statute; courts have
also taken a relatively relaxed approach to this rule at common law; see Finn, supra note
43 at 20. As noted above, the state of the law as to the difference between the delegation
of powers to a third party, which is generally not permissible, and the retention of advice,
which is generally permissible, is less than clear; see supra notes 94-97 and
accompanying discussion.
116 Mothew, supra note 80; Clark Boyce v Mouat, [1994] 1 AC 428.
117 See part 4 below.
118 For a more detailed account of these rules, see generally Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, supra note 41; Leonard I Rotman, Fiduciary Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2006).
119 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra note 17.
120 See Finn, supra note 43 at 4.
121 See BCE, supra note 104 at paras 43, 81 (defining a director’s duty of loyalty
as being “to act in the best interests of the corporation viewed as a good corporate
citizen” (emphasis added)). See also Joseph William Singer, “Corporate Responsibility in
a Free and Democratic Society” (2008) 58 Case W Res L Rev 1; Andrew S Gold, “The
New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law” (2009) 43 UC Davis L Rev 457; Ed Waitzer
and Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE and the Good Corporate ‘Citizen’” (2009) 47
Osgoode Hall LJ 439 at 475-77.
122 Ibid.
123 Elder Advocates, supra note 33 at para 43; BCE, supra note 104 at paras 43,
81.
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4. The Challenge of the Duty of Impartiality
Acting in the best interests of a single beneficiary will in many cases be
relatively straightforward. Assessing, and acting in, the best interests of
multiple beneficiaries can be considerably more difficult, especially when
the interests of different classes of beneficiaries conflict. In these cases, the
duty of loyalty gives rise to a duty of even-handedness which requires a
fiduciary to exercise its powers in an impartial manner.124 Given the range
of interests of pension plan beneficiaries, meeting this standard is a
challenge – one which the Court has only rarely addressed directly, and to
which fiduciaries have largely avoided turning their minds.
Impartiality does not mandate equal outcomes, or even equal
treatment.125 For example, in Anova Inc Employee Retirement Pension
Plan (Administrator of) v Manufacturers Life Insurance Co,126 an employer
was held to be permitted to provide early retirement inducements to a
group of beneficiaries without making similar benefits available to other
beneficiaries, because conferral of the benefit benefitted the company
funding the plan, and thus benefitted the plan as a whole, and did not
impair the administrator’s ability to meet its obligations to other plan
members.127 Likewise, in Neville v Wynne,128 the trustees, in the face of
financial difficulties, decided to reduce benefits across the board and then
further reduce benefits for active members. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal upheld the trustees’ decision, finding that the factors the trustees
considered (including past increases for active members that outpaced
those for retirees and widows) were reasonable and that “formal equality”
between beneficiaries is not required.129
What the duty of impartiality does mandate is fair treatment, holding
that “conduct in administering a trust cannot be influenced by a trustee’s
personal favouritism … nor is it permissible for a trustee to ignore the
interest of some beneficiaries merely as a result of oversight or neglect.”130
124

Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule, § 78.
While the Court has yet to directly address this contention, several lower courts
have accepted this aspect of the duty of impartiality. In doing so, they have relied on
British authority. See infra note 130 and accompanying discussion.
126 (1994), 121 DLR (4th) 162 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)).
127 Ibid at para 58.
128 Neville v Wynne, 2006 BCCA 460, 57 BCLR (4th) 199 [Neville].
129 Ibid at paras 3-5, 9.
130 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule, §78, Comment (b)
(1992); see also Edge v Pensions Ombudsman, [1998] Ch 512, aff’d [1999] EWCA Civ
2013, 4 All ER 546 (CA); Kaplan, supra note 89 at 343; Neville, ibid at para 5; Dinney
v Great-West Life Assurance Co et al, 2009 MBCA 29 at para 90, (2009), 236 Man R (2d)
299; Edell v Sitzer (2001), 55 OR (3d) 198 (SC) at para 173.
125
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The CFA Institute’s Code of Conduct for Members of a Pension
Scheme Governing Body states that a trustee must “consider the different
types of beneficiaries relevant to each pension scheme” and “engage in a
delicate balancing act of taking sufficient risk to generate long-term returns
high enough to support real benefit increases for active participants who
will become future beneficiaries while avoiding a level of risk that
jeopardizes the safety of the payments to existing pensioners.”131 Not only
must outcomes reflect due regard for different beneficiaries’ interests, but
the “process of administration itself,” including communication with
beneficiaries, must be impartial.132
The duty of impartiality assumes a level of proficiency (and, hence,
implies a heightened duty of care) with respect to long-term value creation
and risk mitigation. Peter Drucker recognized this challenge of
intergenerational wealth generation in his epilogue to the 1996 edition of
The Unseen Revolution. Drucker argued for a shift away from short-term
thinking in favour of a focus on defining performance (and results) as
“maximiz[ing] the wealth-producing capacity of the enterprise.”133 He
argued that institutional investors must play a vital role in driving this shift.
This means paying closer attention to reputational and sustainability
concerns, concerns which strike at the heart of investee companies’ ability
to generate wealth in the long run, and which often have an
intergenerational dimension. Consider, for example, the campaign for
divestment from companies doing business in South Africa in the 1980s,
which arose on college campuses and resulted in divestment by
institutional investors, contributing to the elimination of apartheid. While
the fossil-fuel industry (which includes a number of sovereign nations)
may be a more challenging policy concern to address, the link for postsecondary students (and investors with long-term liabilities) is arguably
more obvious.134
There are legitimate questions as to whether the challenge posed by
the duty of impartiality can be met. Leaving aside issues regarding
131 Kurt Schacht and Jonathan Stokes, Code of Conduct for Members of a Pension
Scheme Governing Body (Charlottesville, VA: CFA Institute, 2008).
132 Mark L Ascher, Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, Scott
and Ascher on Trusts, 5th ed (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2006) § 17.15.
133 Peter F Drucker, The Pension Fund Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1996) at 218. This volume is a reprint of Peter F Drucker, The
Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America (New York:
HarperCollins, 1976).
134 See Bill McKibben, “The Reckoning” Rolling Stone 1162 (2 August 2012) 52,
online: Rolling Stone <www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying
-new-math-20120719>.
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adequate tools and incentives to think and act with a view to the long run,
there are concerns about the balancing of competing interests. DeMott
claims that “fiduciary norms lose their bite when they are imposed on
behalf of beneficiaries whose interests systematically conflict.”135
Likewise, Marcoux claims that “[t]he nature of the fiduciary relationship
is such that it is impossible for one to act as a fiduciary for multiple parties
where the interests of those parties are (or are likely to be) in conflict.”136
Hansmann and Kraakman assert that “imposing affirmative duties on
management to protect simultaneously the interests of two or more groups
is unworkable.”137
The question of whether a fiduciary can owe a duty to the interests of
multiple parties whose interests may not coincide is not novel. One need
only look to corporate law, where, as William T Allen suggested, “anyone
trying to understand how our law deals with corporations must have in
mind that they are the locus of many conflicting claims, and not all of those
claims are wholly economic.”138 These conflicting claims became the
focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders, which reviewed a decision by the board of BCE Inc that
bondholders alleged was unfairly prejudicial to their interests.139 In
reaffirming its reasons in Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v
Wise,140 the Court held that there is “no principle that one set of interests
… should prevail over another set of interests. Everything depends on the
particular situation faced by the directors and whether … they exercise
business judgment in a responsible way.”141 This means treating
stakeholders “equitably and fairly,” in accordance with their “reasonable

135

Deborah A DeMott, “Fiduciary Obligation under Intellectual Siege:
Contemporary Challenges to the Duty to be Loyal” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ 471 at
497.
136 Alexei M Marcoux, “A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory”
(2003) 13 Bus Ethics Q 1 at 4.
137 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, “Reflections on the End of History
for Corporate Law” in Abdul Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa, eds, Convergence of
Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012)
32 at 37, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095419>. While these arguments
(together with those cited in notes 135 and 136 above) focus on the challenge of
corporate stakeholders, the issues are at least equally relevant amongst beneficiaries of a
pension fund.
138 William T Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation”
(1992) 14 Cardozo L Rev 261 at 280.
139 BCE, supra note 104.
140 [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Peoples].
141 Ibid at para 84.
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expectations.”142 As was seen in Part 3, the meaning of “reasonable
expectations” is highly malleable (indeed, somewhat tautological). In the
corporate context, it has come to encompass “a broader and longer-term
view” of the “best interests of the corporation,” with due respect for social
and environmental interests.143
The balance of this article will canvass legal theories which may assist
in breathing life into this challenging duty of impartiality in the context of
pension administration and suggest tools to assist in addressing it. In light
of these theories, we argue that pension trustees will increasingly be
obligated, as fiduciaries, to (a) demonstrate respect for social norms, (b)
give beneficiaries a voice in decisions that affect their interests, and (c)
think and act strategically and collectively. This effectively positions
pension fund fiduciaries with public responsibilities to address long-term
social concerns and imposes on them a duty to collaborate with each other
in so doing.
While this outcome may sound somewhat radical, it comports with the
nature of the duties of loyalty and care that form the foundation of
fiduciary law. It also reflects fiduciary law’s overriding concern with
protecting public confidence in fiduciary services, which is crucial to
preserving the dynamic of cooperation central to our fiduciary society.
Furthermore, it reflects the personal and direct (i.e., to beneficiaries with
social as well as economic interests) nature of pension trustees’ fiduciary
duties and the systemically important role pension funds play in our
economy and our society more broadly.
A) Respect for Social Norms and the Duty of Obedience
Not unlike the duty of impartiality, the legal currency of the “duty of
obedience” has waned over the years, but may be re-emerging.144 Rooted
in the ultra vires doctrine, which required corporations to exercise their
powers according to the governing statute and their corporate charter, the
concept (if not the duty itself) has been revived in a series of recent US
cases focusing on the obligation of corporate actors to have due regard for
non-corporate norms.145
142 Ibid at para 64. See also Finn, supra note 43 at 6 (discussing the importance of
“reasonable expectations” in defining the scope of fiduciary obligations).
143 Waitzer and Jaswal, supra note 121 at 496.
144 Atkinson, supra note 7.
145 For a more extensive discussion of the history of ultra vires and how it has
been applied in American case law, see Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law:
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007) at 115-175.
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In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litig146 addressed
directors’ failure to oversee corporate legal compliance systems, finding an
obligation to ensure “corporate information and reporting systems” exist to
provide “timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and
the board … to reach informed judgments concerning the corporation’s
compliance with law and its business performance.”147 Likewise, in Stone
v Ritter,148 the Court found that directors will have breached their duty of
good faith if they “knew or should have known” of violations of law (in
this case, suspicious bank transactions). Similar duties have been found in
the not-for-profit sector.149
As Palmiter argues, the duty of obedience has become “the animating
‘ghost’” behind such regimes as the “reasonable expectations” and “good
faith” doctrines.150 The Supreme Court’s decision in BCE reflects a similar
logic, expanding the duty of loyalty to require directors to act in the “best
interests of the corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen” (emphasis
added), which in turn are defined by reasonable expectations.151 This
broader conception of the duty of loyalty, informed by the concept of a duty
of obedience, comports with the idea of “loyalty” as “[a]cting honorably
towards another.”152 It furthers the broader social purpose of fiduciary
duties by requiring fiduciaries not to undertake unethical actions that
would shake public confidence and trust in fiduciaries and the services
they provide.
With this in mind, we consider how such a reinvigorated duty of
loyalty may interact with pension trustees’ other duties in a specific case:
where trustees must determine the extent to which they will consider
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) norms when making
investment decisions.
Increasingly, the principle of responsible investment forms part of the
fabric of social norms in which pension funds operate.153 The Outcome
146

698 A (2d) 959 (Del Ct Ch 1996).
Ibid at 970.
148 911 A (2d) 362 (Del Sup Ct 2006).
149 See Alan R Palmiter, “Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty” (2010-2011)
55 NY L Sch L Rev 457.
150 Ibid at 478.
151 BCE, supra note 104 at paras 64, 66, 84; see also Peoples, supra note 140 at
para 42.
152 Gold, supra note 121 at 493.
153 See e.g. Laura O’Neill, “Social, Environmental, and Ethical Pension Fund
Disclosure: International Precedents and Options for Canada” (Paper prepared for
Environment Canada by Shareholder Association for Research & Education (SHARE),
March 2007) [unpublished, available from authors]. The Ontario Minister of Finance
147

190

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Document from the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in June
2012 (Rio + 20) acknowledged the importance of corporate sustainability
reporting and encouraged companies to “consider integrating sustainability
information into their reporting cycle.”154 In recent years each of
France,155 Brazil,156 South Africa,157 and Denmark158 have adopted
integrated sustainability reporting requirements. This reflects a growing
awareness that systemic and ESG risks (and opportunities) with material
consequences often are not captured or reflected in financial statements or
other corporate reporting.
The European Commission has committed to “present a legislative
proposal on the transparency of the social and environmental information
provided by companies in all sectors.”159 At the recent Sustainable Stock
Exchanges Global Dialogue, five of the major exchanges (NASDAQ, the
Brazilian BM&FBOVESPA, the Egyptian Exchange, the Istanbul Stock
Exchange, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) committed to work with
investors, companies and regulators to promote long-term sustainable
investment and improved ESG disclosure and performance among their
listed companies.160 The OMX Nordic Exchange has authority to
announced in his 2011 Budget Speech the government’s plan to require pension plans to
disclose whether their Statements of Investment Policies and Procedures address ESG
factors; see Ontario, Ministry of Finance, 2011 Budget: Budget Papers (Toronto: Queen’s
Printer for Ontario, 2011) at 272-73, online: Ontario Ministry of Finance
<http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2011/papers_all.pdf>.
154 UN Commission on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, UN Doc
A/CONF.216/L.1 (2012) at para 47.
155 Loi n° 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour
l’environnement, JO, 13 June 2010, 12905 [Grenelle II Act]. See also France, Ministry of
Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, “Le Grenelle Environnement,” online:
Republique Française <http://www.legrenelle-environnement.fr>.
156 The BM&FBOVESPA stock exchange is encouraging its listed companies to
improve their reporting on ESG issues; see e.g. sources infra note 160.
157 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has a “report or explain” requirement for
integrated reporting. Johannesburg Stock Exchange, JSE Listing Requirements, s 8.63(a),
online: Johannesburg Stock Exchange http://www.jse.co.za/How-To-List/Listingrequirements/JSE-listing-requirements.aspx (Service Issue 15).
158 Danish Financial Statements Act, Danish Act no 448 of 7 June 2001 (as
amended), s 99a (requiring Denmark’s largest public and private enterprises to report on
their policies on corporate social responsibility).
159 European Commission, “Sustainable and responsible business > CSR –
Reporting and Disclosure” (September 2011), online: European Commission <http://ec
.europa .eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility
/reporting-disclosure/index_en.htm>.
160 UNEP Finance Initiative & Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, Press
Release, “Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative: Exchanges listing over 4,600
companies commit to promoting sustainability,” online: (2012) UNEPFI <http://www.
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investigate (and presumably delist) companies that have committed a
“serious or systematic violation of human rights or other ethical
international norms.”161
The challenge for fiduciaries with long-term obligations (and risk
exposures) is to integrate these factors into their investment management
processes. A pension fund trustee’s fiduciary duty of care requires it to
ensure that pension capital is not “placed unduly at risk of loss.”162
Considering ESG factors when making investment/divestment decisions
enables them to evaluate sources of risk that would otherwise be
overlooked. Hence, for example, the Canada Pension Plan Investment
Board (CPPIB), Canada’s largest pension plan, adjusted to this reality by
implementing a Policy on Responsible Investing that requires it to consider
social and environmental factors when making investments.163 This policy
also commits the CPPIB to engage with investee boards and managers to
discuss concerns that arise with respect to these factors.164
But to what extent can trustees refuse to invest in certain companies,
or certain sectors, on the basis of these factors? This question seems to
place at odds the principle of responsible investment with the principle of
diversification.
A 2005 report by the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP for
the UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative concluded that
fiduciaries could lawfully exclude investments that could “reasonably be
assumed offensive to the average beneficiary” on the basis of “clear
breaches of widely recognized norms, such as international conventions on
human rights, labour conditions, tackling corruption and environmental
protection.”165 Yet many major pension plans, including the CPPIB, have
unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2012/Rio20/Press_release_Sustainable_Stock_Exchange
.pdf>. Amanda White, “Exchanges support better disclosure” (13 July 2012), online:
top1000funds.com <http://www.top1000funds.com/analysis/2012/07/13/exchanges
-support-better-disclosure/>.
161 See online: <http://ir.nasdqomx.com/documentdisplay.cfm?DocumentID
=3898>.
162 Christophe, supra note 104 at para 24.
163 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), Policy on Responsible
Investing (Toronto: Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 2010), online: CPPIB
<http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/Responsible_Investing_Policy_August2010.pdf>.
164 Ibid, s 4.0.
165 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, A Legal Framework for the Integration
of Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (London:
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2005) at 96; but see Benjamin J Richardson,
“Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing” (2011) Am Bus LJ 597 at
618-19 [Richardson, “Fiduciary Relationships”] (on the difficulty inherent in determining
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rejected the idea of screening investments based on ESG indicators, taking
the view that their duty to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries
obliges them to maintain a diversified portfolio.166
Two alternative approaches, which seek to reconcile the principles of
diversification and responsible investment, are engagement and positive
screening.167 Engagement includes direct consultation by plan
representatives with firms within their portfolio, the exercise of proxy
votes in support of shareholder proposals relating to ESG factors, and
cooperation with other institutional investors to address collective ESG
concerns. This follows logically from the obligation of pension fiduciaries
to consider the welfare of beneficiaries. Profit seeking at any cost should
not be conflated with fiduciary duty – a much higher standard.
Because engagement does not require the screening of investments, it
is fully compatible with the principle of diversification (along with passive
investment practices) and for this reason is widely used by institutional
investors, including the CPPIB.168 In moving towards its target of having
30% of its portfolio exposed to real assets, British Columbia Investment
Management Corporation (BCIMC) is seeking collaborative engagement
opportunities with similar large institutional investors in that sector.169
Positive screening, also known as the best of sector approach, involves
ranking competing firms in a given sector based on ESG criteria and
investing in the best-performing firms in each sector. While this approach
may not be strictly in accordance with modern portfolio theory, it does
allow trustees to invest responsibly without excluding entire industries or

investors’ views on the use of investment screens, and the somewhat softer position taken
by the UNEP itself in its 2009 follow-up report).
166 CPPIB, supra note 163, s 2.0. The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan takes the
position that an investment screen could only be imposed via an amendment to its
enabling statute. See Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “OTPP – Listening to Members”
(September 2011), online: <http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/connect/otpp_en/Home
/Responsible+Investing/Qs+and+As/>.
167 Finance and Investment Advisory Board, Review of the Application of
Environmental, Social and Governance Principles to Territory Investment Practices
(Australia, Capital Territory, 2007) at 32.
168 CPPIB, supra note 163, s 4.0.
169 Sam Riley, “Collaboration keep[s] deals on tap” (5 September 2012), online:
top1000funds.com <http://www.top1000funds.com/news/2012/09/05/collaborationkeep-deals-on-tap/>. BCIMC also collaborates with other institutional investors on
broader issues of responsible investment. BCIMC, From Complexity to Opportunity:
Annual Report 2011-2012 (Vancouver: BCIMC, 2012) 39, online: BCIMC <http://
www.bcimc.com/publications/pdf/annualreport/bcIMC_AR_2012_web_All.pdf>.
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other sectors of the economy.170 Such an approach is reflected in the
proliferation of market indices which reflect social and environmental
inputs.
The Dutch pension manager PGGM has taken this approach a step
further by creating a dedicated Responsible Equity Portfolio with a longterm investment horizon that integrates ESG factors with active
ownership. The €3 billion portfolio targets 15 to 20 long-term holdings.
Because of this level of concentration, risk tends to be stock-specific and
thus requires close attention to ESG factors in respect of each stock.171
Whether pension fiduciaries choose to address ESG concerns through
engagement, positive screening, or some combination of the two, they will
need to justify their choice with reference to their duties of loyalty and
care, which are owed to individual beneficiaries rather than to the pool of
assets.172 As a consequence, pension fiduciaries must take into account the
interests of those beneficiaries and seek to “do no harm” to them.173 In
summary, investment policies that demonstrate active attention to ESG
considerations, in addition to producing important social benefits, may be
the least legally risky investment approach available to trustees.
B) Giving Beneficiaries a Voice
While our legal systems are infused with the notion of equity and fairness
between contemporaries, we have yet to embrace the notion that justice
should be facilitated between members of different generations. One
exception has been in environmental law. For example, many of the
provinces and the federal government have enacted sustainable
development legislation, designed to improve environmental decisionmaking. The statutes define “sustainable development” as meeting present

170 Benjamin J Richardson, “Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder
Socially Responsible Investment?” (2007) 22 BFLR 145 at 166-67; see also Gil Yaron,
Fiduciary Duties, Investment Screening and Economically Targeted Investing: A Flexible
Approach for Changing Times (Toronto: Shareholder Association for Research and
Education, 17 May 2005) at 39, online: SHARE <http://www.share.ca/files/Fiduciary
_Duties,_Investment_Screening_and_ETI.pdf>.
171 Alex Van der Welden and Otto Van Buul, “Really Investing for the Long Term:
A Case Study” (2012) 5 Rotman Int’l J of Pension Mgmt 50.
172 In this regard, the authors respectfully disagree with the Arthurs Report, supra
note 90, which suggests at 165 that the “unequivocal mandate” of plan administrators is
to “act “in the best interests of the plan” (as opposed to the beneficiaries).
173 Laby, supra note 109 at 78.
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needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. 174
But how can we expect better, longer-term decision making processes
when our legal frameworks are still largely reactive and focussed on the
short term? One possibility is to strengthen the voice of beneficiaries in
fund governance.175 This is already relatively commonplace in
occupational pension plans. For example, the OECD Principles of
Occupational Pension Regulation176 suggests that beneficiaries in defined
contribution plans (in which greater financial risks are born by the
beneficiaries) should be allowed to choose their investment options.177 In
a similar vein, several jurisdictions require plan member (that is,
nominated) representation on trustee boards in certain circumstances.178
While not “representative” in a literal sense, they can play an important
role in linking plan beneficiaries to plan governance.
The idea of giving beneficiaries a voice accords with both the
substance and the purposes of fiduciary law. It helps fiduciaries to fulfill
their duties of loyalty and care by ensuring that they have a reasonable
understanding of the interests and preferences of their beneficiaries. It can
reinforce public confidence in pension administration by creating a
174

See e.g. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33, s 3;
Federal Law on Sustainable Development Act, SC 2008, c 33, s 2; Sustainable
Development Act, RSQ, c D-8.1.1, s 2. This definition is based on that adopted in the
1987 Brundtland Report; see World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) [Brundtland Report].
175 See Richardson, “Fiduciary Relationships,” supra note 165 (exploring both the
merits of this goal and explaining how this goal may be achieved through legislative
change, including the creation of legislative duties to consult and accommodate).
176 OECD, Recommendation on Core Principles of Occupational Pension
Regulation (Paris: OECD, 2004).
177 While studies have shown that individuals faced with unstructured investment
choices tend to choose overly conservative investments, a plan administrator, by (1)
setting default options for beneficiaries depending on their age and other relevant factors
and (2) supplying a “simplified menu” highlighting a limited number of investment
options that may also be appropriate for the beneficiary (while giving the beneficiary the
option of requesting information on all available alternatives), can correct for this
tendency. See Olivia S Mitchell and Stephen P Utkus, “How Behavioral Finance Can
Inform Retirement Plan Design” (2006) 18 J Applied Corp Fin 82 at 91-93; Gur
Huberman, Sheena S Iyengar and Wei Jiang, “Defined Contribution Pension Plans:
Determinants of Participation and Contributions Rates” (2007) 31 J Fin Serv Res 1.
178 See e.g. Supplemental Pension Plans Act, RSQ, c R-15.1, s 147; The Pension
Benefits Act, CCSM c P32, s 28.1(1.2); or Pensions Act 2004, s 241 (UK). As discussed
below, providing beneficiaries a “voice” can be achieved without board representation,
thereby avoiding duty of loyalty concerns.
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transparent process by which beneficiaries can learn about and help inform
important decisions that affect their interests.
For beneficiaries to have a meaningful voice in fund governance, they
must be (a) given sufficient information about the fund to safeguard their
interests, and educated about the provisions of their plan, and (b) consulted
when the trustees contemplate decisions that will affect their interests. We
now turn to explore the roots of these obligations, which courts have
already been recognized in a number of fiduciary contexts, and how they
may apply in the context of pension administration.
1) The Duty to Inform and Educate179
If beneficiaries are to hold trustees to standards of care and loyalty, they
must know what the trust property consists of and how it is being
managed.180 As one US court has noted, “Any notion of a trust without
accountability is a contradiction in terms.”181 The leading US treatise Scott
on Trusts has observed:
beneficiaries are entitled to know what the trust property is and how the trustee has
dealt with it … Where the trust is created in favour in successive beneficiaries, a
beneficiary who has a future interest under the trust, as well as a beneficiary who is
presently entitled to receive income, is entitled to such information, whether his or her
interest is vested or contingent.182

Gallanis notes that such a duty to inform “should result in the beneficiaries
having sufficient information to safeguard their interests … [i.e] to monitor
and evaluate the trustee’s performance and, if necessary, take action in the
event of a breach of trust,” and, by implication, “the duty to inform should
179 In this section, we focus on the duty to inform as it applies in trust law context.
As will become clear in subpart 2, where we discuss the duty to consult, the requirement
that beneficiaries be given relevant information about events that affect their interests
appears in the context of a number of fiduciary relationships.
180 David Hayton, “The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship” in AJ Oakley,
ed, Trends in Contemeporary Trust Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 47 at
49.
181 In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 403 N.W.2d 721, 736 (Neb.
1987); see also Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man), [2003] UKPC 26 at para 51
(“[the] principled and correct approach is to regard the right to seek disclosure of trust
documents as one aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise, and if necessary
to intervene in, the administration of trusts”).
182 Austin Wakeman Scott, The Law of Trusts (Boston: Little, Brown & Co: 1939),
§ 173; see also Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Frachter, The Law of Trusts,
4th ed (Boston: Little, Brown & Co: 1987), § 173; Mark L Asher and Margit P Rigney,
Scott on Trusts, 5th ed (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2006), § 173.
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not be limited to the provision of information upon request. There must be
enough information provided so that beneficiaries can make an informed
request.”183 Likewise, the duty should extend as broadly as possible, to
protect against the “danger of partiality.”184
In Froese v Montreal Trust Company of Canada,185 Froese (a
pensioner) was not made aware of the fact that his former employer had
ceased to make regular contributions to the plan, which, ultimately,
resulted in the plan being wound up. He claimed against the trustee for the
plan’s shortfall because it had failed to warn the beneficiaries that the
employer was not making regular contributions. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal held that there was “an overarching obligation upon a
custodial or administrative trustee to pay attention to the interests of the
beneficiaries additional to its contractual duties provided in the trust
indenture.”186 While “this obligation is not unlimited: it arises only within
the function assigned to or assumed by the trustee,” it includes at minimum
a duty to inform beneficiaries when their pension fund is at risk.187 This
“duty to warn” of a risk of harm to the fund, the court added, was simply
an aspect of the trustee’s general duty of care.188 The decision attracted
much commentary at the time, but has yet to be overruled.189
One means of fulfilling this duty to inform, in a way that answers the
concerns regarding intergenerational equity and sustainable development
highlighted at the beginning of this part, may be to embrace concepts such
as the intergenerational reports which are required by law in Australia.190
183

TP Gallanis, “The Trustee’s Duty to Inform” (2007) NCL Rev 1595 at 1627.
But see Tito v Waddell (No 2), [1977] Ch 106, at 242 (where Megarry VC states that
“trustees are under a duty to answer inquiries about the trust property … [b]ut that is a
far remove from saying that trustees have a duty to proffer information and advice to their
beneficiaries; and I think the courts should be very slow to advance on the road of
imposing such a duty”). Canada, along with the United States, appears to be more open
to extending the duty to inform to include proactive disclosure of relevant, nonconfidential information.
184 Gallanis, ibid.
185 Supra note 88.
186 Ibid at 736.
187 Ibid at 737.
188 Ibid at 741.
189 See e.g. Hugh MB O’Reilly, “Liability of Asset Custodians and Other
Fiduciaries” (1997) 14 Pension Intelligence II; Nancy B Chaplick, “Retirement Plan
Disclosure Obligations: Some Hidden Issues for Financial Institutions” (2000) 19 EP &
PJ 51.
190 Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cth), s 2(4) (“The Treasurer is to publicly
release and table an intergenerational report at least once every 5 years”). For an example
of such a report, see Commonwealth of Australia, Australia to 2050: Future Challenges
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010).
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To be relevant to concerns about distributive fairness, such reports would
need to focus specifically on the needs and perspectives of young people
who are alive now or yet to be born.191
2) The Duty to Consult
Pension trustees across the Western world face soaring beneficiary
longevity and plan deficits and, as a result, difficult choices.192 To maintain
the solvency of their funds, trustees will likely need to raise premiums and
cut benefits. Many plans have moved from a defined benefit system to a
defined contribution or hybrid system, which transfers risk to individual
contributors.193 Future generations of plan members will likely pay a
disproportionate share of the costs of reform.
The Arthurs Report argues that because the risks and costs associated
with these “hard choices” will be borne in large part by plan members, they
should be allowed to help make these choices.194 The Report argues for
greater transparency from plan administrators and more involvement by
plan members in plan governance.195 This recommendation echoes calls in
other jurisdictions for the recognition of a statutory “duty to consult” plan
members before fiduciaries take actions that affect their interests.196
Consultation and accommodation is a critical element of perspective
taking – seeing issues through the eyes of others. It may also prove a useful
tool for reducing the risk that disgruntled plan members will turn to
litigation, and, in turn, the risk that a court will conclude that trustees failed
to consider the best interests of all of the beneficiaries and exercise care in
safeguarding them. It would therefore be prudent for administrators to
begin developing frameworks for consulting with beneficiaries (or their
191 For such a critique of the Australian reports see Judith C Bessant, Michael
Emslie and Rob Watts, “Accounting for Future Generations: Intergenerational Equity in
Australia” (2011) 70 Aust J of Pub Admin 143.
192 See e.g. “Promise Now, Bill Your Children” The Economist 403:8789 (16 June
2012), online: <http://www.economist.com/node/21556945>; Alexandre Laurin and
William Robson, “Ottawa’s Pension Gap: The Growing and Under-reported Cost of
Federal Employee Pensions” Pension Papers (13 December 2011), online: <http://www.
cdhowe.org/pdf/ebrief_127.pdf>; Mercer, Press Release, “US pension deficits widen for
second straight year” (5 January 2012), online: Mercer <http://www.mercer.com/press
-releases/US-pension-deficits-widen-for-second-year>.
193 “Over to you,” The Economist 399:8728 (9 April 2011), online: <http://www.
economist.com/node/18502061>.
194 Arthurs Report, supra note 90 at 53-54.
195 Ibid at 155-77.
196 See e.g. Gary Watt, Trusts and Equity, 2d ed (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006) at 437; Richardson, “Fiduciary Relationships,” supra note 165 at 631-38.
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representatives) now, rather than to wait for legislative reform and the
possibility of litigation in the interim.
The concepts of consultation and accommodation are closely
connected with the concept of the fiduciary relationship developed by the
Supreme Court. Consultation entails informing affected groups about a
proposal, soliciting information from these groups about how they would
be affected by the proposal, and being prepared to modify the proposal to
accommodate these groups’ interests.197
By engaging in consultation, a fiduciary may learn more about what
the best interests of its beneficiaries are and how its actions will affect
these beneficiaries’ interests.198 It may also learn more about the social
norms beneficiaries hope will guide investment decisions. With the benefit
of more information, the fiduciary will likely be able to strike a balance
that serves the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole (as investors and as
responsible citizens) while minimizing the specific harms caused to the
interests of some classes of beneficiaries. When faced with the kind of hard
choices cited by the Arthurs Report, consultation can evidence the trustees’
prudence and their loyalty to the best interests of the plan’s beneficiaries.
Other fiduciaries that are required to balance competing interests have
already been held to generally be required to consult with beneficiaries or
stakeholders before taking action that might impair their interests. The
Crown, for example, is generally permitted to balance Aboriginal interests
against broader public interests.199 But before engaging in a balancing
exercise that may harm Aboriginal rights or title, the Crown must fulfill a
formal duty to consult and accommodate those Aboriginals who may be
affected by its actions.200 This duty is not tantamount to a duty to agree. It
197 See Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73,
[2004] 3 SCR 511 at paras 16, 35, 46-47 [Haida Nation] (where the Court stated that the
Crown’s duty to consult with and accommodate the interests of Aboriginal peoples is
“grounded in the honour of the Crown … [and] arises when the Crown has knowledge
… of the potential existence of Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that
might adversely affect it”). See also Sonia Lawrence and Patrick Macklem, “From
Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown’s Duty to Consult”
(2000) 29 Can Bar Rev 252 at 264.
198 Finn, supra note 43 at 22 (“If the fiduciary is to act in his beneficiaries’ interests
… in some cases he may only be able to exercise his discretion properly by obtaining
information from them. Likewise he should, where appropriate, explain his own views to
them”).
199 Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 SCR 245 at para 96.
200 Haida Nation, supra note 197 at paras 18, 21-38. In West Moberly First
Nations v British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines), 2011 BCCA 247, [2011] 3 CNLR
343, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No 399 (QL), the BC Court of Appeal
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does not extend a veto to First Nations over government action. Rather, it
requires that both sides negotiate in good faith and that the Crown take
reasonable steps to accommodate Aboriginal interests.201
While consultation is simpler when undertaken with cohesive groups
who enjoy established structures of representation, it is increasingly being
extended to groups with little or no such cohesion. For example, corporate
directors, in exercising their business judgment as to the best interests of
the corporation, are permitted to balance the interests of various
stakeholders and make decisions that help some stakeholders while
harming others. But before reaching these decisions, they are obliged to
consider the position of the affected stakeholders.202 While there is not a
formal duty to consult, exercising business judgment in practice
increasingly entails consulting with stakeholders. For instance, in BCE, the
board was held to have met this requirement by receiving submissions
from stakeholders and meeting with them or their representatives.203
The concept of consultation is familiar to pension law. As noted, there
is case law that indicates that pension plan trustees must look to the
interests of different classes of plan members before making decisions that
affect their interests.204 In addition, Ontario pension legislation requires
administrators to consult with beneficiaries before applying to amend a
pension plan in a way “that would … adversely affect the rights or
obligations of a … person entitled to payment from the pension fund.”205
Federal pension legislation, along with pension legislation in Ontario,
British Columbia, and Nova Scotia, also allow current and former
members of a plan to establish an advisory committee to monitor and make
recommendations regarding the administration of the plan.206 The federal
legislation provides that, where the administrator is a pension committee,

adopted a broad interpretation of the duty to consult, holding that it must include
consideration of “cumulative effects” of “past wrongs” and the impact of future
developments extending beyond the immediate consequences of the mining exploration
permits that were in issue. The duty to consult also extends beyond situations where the
Crown is under a fiduciary obligation, applying in any situation where “the honour of the
Crown” is engaged; see Haida Nation, ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 BCE, supra note 104 at paras 101-102. See also Peoples, supra note 140 at
paras 41-42.
203 BCE, ibid at paras 103-104.
204 See e.g. supra notes 126-132.
205 OPBA, supra note 96, s 26(1).
206 Ibid, s 24; BCPBA, supra note 96, s 69; NSPBA, supra note 96, s 30A; CPBSA,
supra note 89, s 7.2.
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plan members may be represented on that committee if a majority of them
so request.207
Applying a duty to consult in this manner would help to give existing
beneficiaries a voice in pension plan decision making. The more
challenging question, however, is how to provide a voice for contingent
beneficiaries. Brown Weiss has suggested giving standing to
representatives of future generations in technical and administrative
proceedings or appointing a public office charged with “ensuring that
positive laws conserving our resources are observed.”208 Sunstein’s
principle of intergenerational neutrality (that “the decade of one’s birth has
no moral relevance any more than does one’s skin colour or sex”)209 may
be a helpful norm for such surrogates to advocate and monitor, as could the
Great Law of the Iroquois, which requires that decisions be made with
regard for the impact on the next seven generations.210
Here, again, existing legal instruments in trust law may be instructive
and helpful. The use of a “trust advisor,” typically to work with the trust’s
asset managers in reviewing their decisions, and the logic associated with
them, dates back a century.211 A more recent phenomenon is the advent of
trust protectors.212 This instrument gained popularity for investors who
seek to use offshore trusts but are reluctant to cede full control of their
assets to a foreign trustee. To address this problem, legislation in various
offshore jurisdictions legitimated the concept of a domestic “trust protector,”
207

CPBSA, ibid, s 7.1.
Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law,
Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational
Publishers, 1989) at 120.
209 Cass Sunstein, Worst Case Scenarios (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 2007) at 269.
210 Linda Clarkson, Vern Morissett and Gabriel Régallet, Our Responsibility to the
Seventh Generation (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development,
1992), online: www.iisd.org/pdf/seventh_gen.pdf.
211 See e.g. In re Rogers (1928), 63 OLR 180. The trust litigated in In re Rogers
provided that the “executors and trustees shall be governed by the advice of one who is
neither a beneficiary nor a trustee or executor himself;” see ibid at 182. The advisor in
that case, conflicted by a personal interest, purported to veto the trustee’s sale of shares.
The Court, affirming that a trust advisor’s role is inherently limited, allowed the sale of
the shares without the advisor’s consent. It found that to do otherwise would “place [the
advisor] in the…position of a sort of super-trustee who is neither responsible to the
trustees or the beneficiaries nor subject to the control or discretion of the Court;” see ibid
at 183.
212 See e.g. Stewart Sterk, “Trust Protectors, Agency Costs and Fiduciary Duty”
(2006) 27 Cardozo L Rev 2761; Philip J Ruce, “The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A
Question of Fiduciary Power. Should a Trust Protector be Held to a Fiduciary
Standard?”(2010) 59 Drake L Rev 67.
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who can have limited powers over the trustee, as well as the trust itself,
without defeating the original purpose of the offshore trust (by giving
control over the trust assets to the settlor or beneficiary).213
Given the dynamic nature of social norms and in the absence of clear
jurisprudence as to the meaning of “reasonable expectations,”214 one
might expect fiduciaries to consult with stakeholders as a matter of course.
Allowing plan members to play a role in the decision-making process
increases the likelihood that they will see the decision reached by the
trustees as fair. It reduces trustees’ legal risk by providing strong evidence
that the trustees made their decision in accordance with their duties of
loyalty and care. Retaining a trust advisor or trust protector to represent
future generations of beneficiaries may lend further legitimacy to trustees’
decisions.
3) The Duty to be Strategic
One of the unintended consequences of the intense regulatory focus on risk
management and compliance has been to distract attention from the
(complementary) need for strategy management and oversight. In the
corporate context, a recent McKinsey survey of over 2,000 executives
about a set of 10 basic strategic tests found that only 35% of their firms’
strategies satisfied more than three of them.215 In the uncertain times we
live in, ensuring that organizations achieve their purpose (in the case of
pension plans, to satisfy their obligations to beneficiaries) requires leaders
213 See Jan Dash and Herman Liburd, “The Role of Protectors in Offshore Trusts”
(2003) 1 Trust Q Rev 19.
214 One source of “reasonable expectations” may prove to be soft law; see Ryan
Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law” (2004) 51 Duke LJ 621 at 638-56 (discussing how “acculturation”
through the development of norms can influence state actors). Soft law also has a
tendency to develop into binding treaty law later on; see e.g. Geoffrey Palmer, “New
Ways to Make Environmental Law” (1992) Am J Int’l L 259 at 269 (“soft law … is
particularly helpful in creating a climate that can produce a hard law instrument”); Kal
Raustiala, “Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law” (2002) 43
Va J Int’l L 1 at 86 (“[s]oft law is often seen as a stepping stone to hard (treaty) law”).
See also UNESCO, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations
Towards Future Generations, GC Res 44, UNESCOOR, 29th Sess, UNESCO Doc 29
C/Res 44 (12 November 1997).
215 See Chris Bradley, Martin Hirt and Sven Smit, “Have You Tested Your Strategy
Lately?” McKinsey Quarterly (January 2011) 40, online: McKinsey Quarterly
<http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Have_you_tested_your_strategy_lately_2711>;
Chris Bradley, Lowell Bryan and Sven Smit, “Managing the Strategy Journey” McKinsey
Quarterly (July 2012) 50, online: McKinsey Quarterly <http://www.mckinseyquarterly
.com/Managing_the_strategy_journey_2991>.
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to give as much attention to developing and executing strategies as to risk
management and operational issues. The challenge may be to refocus legal
norms on managing strategy, as well as risk. One commentator has gone
so far as to recommend clarifying the fiduciary duties of corporate directors
specifically to reflect this role and responsibility.216
A focus on strategy imposes an additional and necessary discipline on
trustees insofar as it defines a mission and processes for long-term value
creation that informs trustee conduct. Fund management and oversight is
clearly about more than limiting losses. While policy-makers typically
think of “risk” in its down-side sense, it is difficult, conceptually, to
separate it from the management of strategy. Both require the engagement
of senior management and the trustees on an ongoing basis to ensure that
there are rigorous and effective processes in place.
Institutional capacity to understand, plan for, and adapt to change
requires strong leaders with the capacity for strategic thinking. It requires
leaders who can contextualize and manage expectations as to what may be
achieved and in what time frame. In times of stress, it’s human nature to
adopt a narrow, short-term focus. Under-investment by fund fiduciaries in
broader, longer-term analytic capacity (for example, to think about the
collective macro impacts of their fund’s micro investment decisions) is
analagous to under-investment in physical infrastructure. In both cases, the
consequences are not immediate, but in the long run, they diminish
institutional and systemic resilience, transfer costs to a future cohort, and
create cascades of collateral damage when there is a failure.217
5. Conclusion: The Pressing Duty to Collaborate
In recounting the Supreme Court’s extended effort to develop a broader
conceptual framework for fiduciary duties and exploring how that
framework might be applied to the challenges faced by pension trustees,
we have tried to identify various emerging and potential obligations (and
consequential liabilities) as well as steps that might be taken to address
them. While our focus has been on how best to respond to obligations
flowing from the duties of loyalty and impartiality,” there remains a

216 Nadelle Grossman, “The Duty to Think Strategically” LA L Rev (forthcoming
in 2013) online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919145> (linking this duty to the duty
of good faith held to exist in Caremark and Stone v Ritter).
217 See e.g. Roger L Martin, “The Gaming of Games” Drucker Society Europe
Blog (17 October 2012), online: Drucker Society Europe Blog http://www.
druckerforum.org/blog/?p=190. Martin argues that while stock lending by pension funds
increased annual returns, it will immeasurably reduce long-term returns.
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broader and pressing duty of care challenge that is of immediate relevance
to pension trustees.
Very few crises respect institutional mandates or jurisdictions. A
classic immune system response is swarming – blood clotting when we cut
ourselves and white blood cells fighting an infection. This type of selforganization, the ability to marshal an “all hands on deck” reaction, is
critical to building resilient institutions. Achieving this level of intelligence
and “response-ability” requires extensive networks, within and across
organizations, which have to be built up over time, invested in and
nurtured.218
In his book Nonzero,219 Wright argues that as societies become more
complex, we are driven, in pursuing our self-interest, to cooperate and find
nonzero-sum solutions to social problems – solutions that produce benefits
for third parties as well as ourselves. This is the logic underlying the
Court’s promotion of the “fiduciary society” concept and similar
developments in other jurisdictions.220
The notion is not new; it emerges from game theory.221 Nor has its
logic escaped those responsible for international financial stability.
Consider, for example, the Financial Stability Board (which evolved from
the Financial Stability Forum).222 It represents part of a continuing effort
to improve collaborative oversight of systemically significant financial
intermediaries by embracing a new approach to prudential supervision and
crisis management.223 Similar efforts to develop better structures and
practices of collaborative crisis management are now playing out within
and beyond the European Union. Over time, such efforts, in and of
themselves, give rise to reasonable expectations (for example, the
expectation that strategies of collaboration will be deployed with
increasing reliability to stabilize markets) that in turn inform legal norms.
The obstacles to collaboration have been the subject of academic
research since the publication almost fifty years ago of The Logic of
218 Kevin Lynch and Ed Waitzer, “Building resilience in an age of crisis” Globe
and Mail (17 January 2011) B2.
219 Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage
Books, 2001).
220 See Frankel, “Fiduciary Law,” supra note 44; Rotman, supra note 31 (on how
this framework likely also drives the development of fiduciary law in the United States).
221 See e.g. Axelrod, supra note 48; Rapoport, supra note 48.
222 G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (2 April 2009).
223 Louis W Pauly, “The Old and the New Politics of International Financial
Stability” (2009) 47 J of Common Market Studies 955.
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Collective Action,224 in which Mancur Olson challenged the “democratic”
notion that groups would form and take collective action when doing so
would serve their common interests. Instead, he asserted that, absent
coercion or direction, “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests”225 (this assertion is referred to as
the “zero contribution thesis”). However, as Wright observes, selforganized governance regimes are not only possible but, increasingly,
imperative. There is a wealth of empirical research that identifies
contextual variables that support and reinforce collaborative responses to
social problems.226
The opportunity for pension trustees (and other institutional investors)
to have an effect when acting collectively, both amongst themselves and
with asset providers, is great, as is the opportunity cost of defaulting (or
feigning collective action with no resolve to execute on the “talk”).227 This
reflects the dominant (and still-growing) level of institutional ownership as
well as the challenges of retirement income provision. The scale of such
investment pools and the demands on them will certainly attract increasing
expectations and scrutiny.
The challenges to effective institutional collaboration by fund trustees
(and other institutional investors) with respect to governance rights – both
at the level of an individual corporation and systemically, are at least twofold. First, existing business models (including metrics and compensation)
reward expertise in managing portfolios (as opposed to investing in and
engaging with companies), measured comparatively over the short term.
These models reward actors that deliver competitively superior short-term
performance while minimizing short-term costs and punish actors that
make governance investments that do not pay off in the short term. Second,
to the extent governance interventions are unlikely to have a strong effect
on portfolio returns and may impair relative performance (especially
where others can free ride or the fund needs to deviate from a passive index
in order to overweight its investment in the target company), the logic of
diversification further cuts against investment in governance rights.228

224

(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965).
Ibid at 2.
226 See e.g. Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms”
(2000) 14 J of Econ Perspectives 137; Elinor Ostrom, “A diagnostic approach for going
beyond panaceas” (2007) 104 Proc Nat’l Acad Sci USA 15181.
227 See Ed Waitzer, “Defeating Short-Termism: Why Pension Funds Must Lead”
(2009) 2:3 Rotman Int’l J of Pension Mgmt 4.
228 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B Rock, “Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control” (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1021.
225
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Given institutional investors’ competency and incentive deficits with
regard to governance, it is not surprising that their governance rights are
undervalued. As Gilson and Gordon note, such investors are “not so much
rationally passive as rationally reticent,” waiting for other actors to identify
problems and propose solutions that serve the interests of investors’
beneficiaries.229 They note the emergence of shareholder activists that seek
to fill this role, characterizing such activists as “governance entrepreneurs”
– framing and seeking to force governance changes but ultimately
dependent upon attracting broad support from institutional investors (and
thereby giving such institutions indirect governance capacities).230
There remains considerable distance between academic and regulatory
ideals and the present reality. Institutions remain “stubbornly responsive
but not proactive.”231 While shareholder activists clearly fill a gap in
governance markets, they may also exacerbate the myopic consequences
of existing institutional competencies and incentives where these activists’
goals are oriented towards the short-term.232 They may also help to mask
the underlying problem by suggesting that institutions can and will play a
more proactive role in corporate governance. The general acceptance of
principles of responsible investment, active ownership and similar
initiatives can easily become a facade to hide behind. Gilson and Gordon
refer to this challenge as the “possibility that the institutions will, like
Pinocchio, come to act like real boys – like real owners and actively
supervise the performance of professional management.”233
Similar hazards arise from the growing subscription (but not
necessarily meaningful commitment or adherence) by institutional
investors to “best practice” standards – too often giving rise to an
appearance of stewardship by “ticking boxes” with respect to the features
(rather than the functions) of good governance and stewardship. An
additional risk is that such standards often presume, incorrectly, “a unique
229 Ronald J Gilson and Jeffrey N Gordon, “The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights” Colum L Rev
(forthcoming in 2013) at 48, online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.cin/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2206391.>.
230 Ibid at 31. See also Edward B Rock, “The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism” (1991) 79 Geo LJ 445 at 479-81.
231 Gilson and Gordon, supra note 229 at 22.
232 See e.g. Martin Lipton, Steven A Rosenblum and Karessa L Cain, “Some
Thoughts for Directors in 2012” (7 December 2011) at 2-3, online: Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz <http://www.wlrk.com/files/2012/SomeThoughtsforBoardsofDirectorsin
2012.pdf>.
233 Gilson and Gordon, supra note 229 at 23. See also Marcel Kahan and Edward
B Rock, “Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control” (2007) 155 U
Pa L Rev 1021 at 1047, 1091-92.
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set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and view
convergence toward those arrangements as inherently desirable.”234 Worse
yet, such standards tend to be backward-looking – based on and reacting
to past failures, rather than anticipating where markets will be going. This
invites gaming, similarly reactive (and often politically-driven) regulation,
and the ossification of governance processes.235 The medical equivalent
would be to treat only acute symptoms, rather than taking a holistic view
of the patient. In engineering terms, the equivalent would be to fix
defective parts each time there is a failure rather than ensure quality and
integrity from the outset. The costs of such reactive governance – both in
tangible terms and in terms of public trust – are immense.
A similar dynamic is at play with respect to competing time horizon
equilibria. In the first, patience wins the day, where the proportion of longterm investors increases and “the self-correcting tendencies of market
prices are thus reinforced, further supporting long-term investors.”236 The
other operates in reverse gear: the proportion of short-term traders grows
and the very meaning of “short-term” compresses, increasing the degree of
misalignment in prices.237 Haldane has argued that, for a variety of
reasons, financial markets have succumbed to a self-destructive cycle of
impatience.
This challenge was illustrated in a recent Wall Street Journal article
about a training simulation run by Brandes Investment Partners LP for
pension plan trustees, in which teams of about five trustees are competing
to produce the best returns. While, given the nature and duration of pension
fund obligations, trustees should be focusing on results over longer
periods, the article notes that the participants tended to focus on short-term
results: “[I]t’s hard to resist a manager on a hot streak—and it’s tempting
to dump a long-term winner in a slump.”238
234

Dani Rodrik, “Second-Best Institutions” (2008) 98 Am Econ Rev 100 at 100.
Andrew G Haldane and Vasileios Madouros, “The Dog and the Frisbee”
(Address given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th economic policy
symposium, “The changing policy landscape,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 31 August 2012)
at 6-8, online: Bank for International Settlements <http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a
.pdf>
236 Andrew G Haldane, “Patience and Finance” (Address given at the Oxford
China Business Forum, Beijing, 2 September 2010) at 11, online: Bank of England
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2010/speech445
.pdf>.
237 Ibid.
238 Karen Damato and Veronica Dagher, “Game Changer: Play Money Teaches
Real Lessons on Managing Investments” Wall Street Journal (4 June 2012) C5, online:
Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230420360457739
4431579048676.html>.
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Recall our initial assertion that the “Canadian model” of pension
management and delivery “punches above its weight.” This was based on
the size of major Canadian public pension plans and the fact that
considerable effort has been invested in best practices in internal
governance and investment management. Many other jurisdictions are
embracing these concepts in designing their retirement income institutions.
In such a framework, it should be both simpler and imperative to move
beyond a focus on portfolio-level benefits to a consideration of systemic
effects. As Lydenberg and others have argued, the narrow focus on
outperforming (or, more precisely, not underperforming) market
benchmarks that emerged as a rational “fiduciary” response to modern
portfolio theory is based on zero-sum logic.239 It seeks merely to beat the
market today, without considering how investment can be used to expand
and improve the market tomorrow.
Ironically, as financial assets have been aggregated and financial
decisions scaled up, the portfolio-level focus on investment has tended to
both give rise to and ignore systemic risks. For example, it was such
behaviour that contributed to the proliferation of risky products (driven by
investors’ increased appetite for risks and return). By ignoring the
relationship between portfolio investment and market-level returns,
modern portfolio theory also increased the role of speculators (and high
frequency traders) and narrowed the temporal focus of markets. As
previously discussed, “herd behaviour” has tended to amplify rather than
help control risks.
Given the lessons learned, as well as the systemic significance and
impact of institutional investors as “universal owners,”240 it is intuitively
compelling that pension fiduciaries should be focusing on ways in which
their investments can benefit the whole and, in so doing, mitigate risk and
increase return. This means taking into consideration how their investment
decisions will affect the stability of financial systems, the direction of the
economy and the sustainability of our environment.

239

See e.g. Steve Lydenberg, “Beyond Risk: Notes Toward a Responsible
Investment Theory” in James Hawley, Shyam Kamath amd Andrew Williams, eds,
Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global
Financial Crisis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) 26; see also
Peter L Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005) at 120-121.
240 James P Hawley and Andrew T Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism:
How Institutional Investors can make Corporate America more Democratic (Pittsburgh:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
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Put differently, the fact that an investment decision may result in
positive relative financial returns over the short-term (in which
performance management is typically measured) has no bearing on
whether such an investment will yield benefits to current or future pension
beneficiaries. Such decisions (and hence the duty of care) must take into
account the relationship between investment decisions and systems in
which the beneficiaries (will) live.241
The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)
addresses these issues in its recent sustainable investment report.242 The
report highlights the need to work in partnership with others to build
consensus and promote ESG goals that contribute to sustainable risk
adjusted investment returns.243 CalPERS has also adopted a set of
principles of accountability and transparency for their own governance.244
Current imbalances in our economy, if unaddressed, are likely to
exacerbate a range of health, educational and social problems in what
could easily give rise to a vicious cycle.245 Ultimately, investing is a means
for pension fund trustees to ensure the future well-being of beneficiaries.
Financial returns are a necessary element but, in considering the interests
of beneficiaries, so, too, are other concerns. It is in this context that pension
trustees become “public” fiduciaries. Given the mission, size, and systemic
significance of pension funds, this suggests a “duty to collaborate” (and
consequential behavioural shifts). This goes beyond seeking cost
advantages to the heart of effecting systemic reform.

241

See e.g. Lydenberg, supra note 25.
CalPERS, “Towards Sustainable Investment – Taking Responsibility”
(October 2012), online: <http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/news
/invest-corp/towards-sustainable-investment.xml>.
243 Ibid.
244 CalPERS states that these principles reflect each Board member’s commitment
to: (a) being effective and capable fiduciaries; (b) being ethical leaders; (c) being open
and accountable to our stakeholders; (d) being risk intelligent and insightful in decisions;
(e) taking a long-term view of the needs of beneficiaries and system participants; and (f)
undertaking continuous learning and adaptation to changing conditions. For detailed
descriptions of each principle see, online: http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about
/organization/board/02152012-board-governance.pdf.
245 See e.g. James Manyika et al, “An Economy that Works: Job Creation and
America’s Future” McKinsey Global Institute (June 2011), online: McKinsey &
Company <http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/labor_markets/an_economy
_that_works_for_us_job_creation> (which discounts the possibility of a recovery to “full
employment,” i.e., 5 percent unemployment, in the United States before 2020 and
documents the mismatch of predicted opportunities with available skills and education
levels).
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A recent Harvard Business Review blog analogized to the beginnings
of the US space program, where a perceived crisis (losing the US’s
scientific edge to the Soviet Union) led leaders to think and collaborate
across sectors based on timescales that would outlive their leadership and
in ways that would inspire new generations.246 Forming networks of
thought, communication and collective action has become a fiduciary
imperative in addressing today’s critical challenges. Early efforts to do so
have been characterized by solemn declarations and aspirational standards
– a necessary but insufficient starting point. There is increasing urgency to
impose accountability for action on such networks – developing and
operationalizing standards that will better enable the pension fund
community to fulfill its obligations to beneficiaries (and a corresponding
commitment by the fund trustees). If not addressed proactively, the
likelihood of incremental, reactive regulation and of disruptive liability
awards (and other costs) is high.247 These are the suboptimal defaults.
There remains much to learn about the possibilities of success, failure
and reinvention. That process must be addressed through collective action
that can stand the test of time. Current efforts to do so should be renewed
and supported.

246 Eric Lowitt, “What the Space Race Can Teach Us About Collaboration” HBR
Blog Network (17 October 2012), online: HBR Blog Network <http://blogs
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247 See e.g. Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (UK), c 5, s 33A(1);
Localism Act 2011 (UK), c 20, s 110(1) (which imposes a “duty to cooperate” on various
national and local authorities to “engage constructively, actively and on an ongoing
basis” to develop strategic policies and requires local councils to consider joint
approaches to plan making).

